Abbottabad Letters of Osama Bin Laden


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Abbottabad Letters of Osama Bin Laden
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Osama Bin Laden’s Abbottabad Letter: Bin Ladin’s documents do not explicitly point to any institutional Pakistani support for Bin Ladin. Bin Ladin’s second main concern was to find alternative places outside Afghanistan and Pakistan to mount “external operations.”
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In contrast to Bin Ladin’s public statements that focused on the injustice of those he believed to be the “enemies” (a`da’) of Muslims, namely corrupt “apostate” Muslim rulers and their Western “overseers,” the focus of his private letters is Muslims’ suffering at the hands of his jihadi “brothers” (ikhwa). He was at pains advising them to abort domestic attacks that cause Muslim civilian casualties and instead focus on the United States, “our desired goal.” Bin Ladin’s frustration with regional jihadi groups and his seeming inability to exercise control over their actions and public statements is the most compelling story to be told on the basis of the 17 declassified documents. The main points from each of the report’s four sections are briefly summarized below.
Documents Found from Osama’s Abbottabad Home (Thought to be his speech etc.)

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Pakistan
Unlike the explicit and relatively substantive references to the Iranian regime, the documents do not have such references about Pakistan. Although there are notes about “trusted Pakistani brothers,” there are no explicit references to any institutional Pakistani support. The one instance Pakistani intelligence is mentioned is not in a supporting role: in the course of giving detailed instructions about the passage his released family from Iran should take, Bin Ladin cautioned `Atiyya to be most careful about their movements lest they be followed. More precisely, he remarked that “if the [Pakistani] intelligence commander in the region is very alert, he would assume that they are heading to my location and he would monitor them until they reach their destination.”203 This reference does not suggest that Bin Ladin was on good terms with the Pakistani intelligence community. Another reference worth highlighting in this regard, is that Bin Ladin did not appear to enjoy freedom of movement with his family. In his long list of security measures to be followed by the “brothers” to evade the eyes of the authorities, he wrote to `Atiyya that it is most important not to allow children to leave the house except in emergency situations. For nine years prior to his death, Usama bin Ladin proudly told `Atiyya that he and his family adhered to such strict measures, precluding his children from playing outdoors without the supervision of an adult who could keep their voices down.204 Bin Ladin, it was said, could run but he could not hide. He seems to have done very little running and quite a lot of hiding. Rather than outright protection or assistance from states such as Iran or Pakistan, Bin Ladin’s guidance suggests that the group’s leaders survived for as long as they did due to their own caution and operational security protocols.205 While the release of new documents may necessitate a reevaluation of al-Qa`ida’s relations to Iran and Pakistan, the documents for now make it clear that al-Qa`ida’s ties to Iran were the unpleasant byproduct of necessity, fueled by mutual distrust and antagonism. The limited discussion of the Pakistani military does not lend itself to any final determination on ties between bin laden and Pakistani state or actors within it, but bin laden’s emphasis on security precautions suggests that fear and suspicion dominated his calculations.

Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden had a contentious and  troubled relationship with al Qaeda’s affiliates around the world,according to a  new study of documents seized during the raid on his compound one year ago.  Documents from the bin Laden compound reveal the al Qaeda leader’s frustration  with what he saw to be the incompetence of the affiliates, according to the  report by the Combating Terrorism Center at the U.S. Military Academy at West  Point.

Here are some excerpts from the report. The full report is posted here, and here are  the actual (translated) letters.

The Scope of the Report

It was reported that “thousands of items” were captured from Usama bin  Ladin’s compound during the Abbottabad raid. To date, however, only 17 documents  have been declassified and provided to the CTC, all of which are hereby released  with the publication of this report. They consist of electronic letters or draft  letters, totaling 175 pages in the original Arabic and 197 pages in the English  translation. They were written over several years. The earliest is dated  September 2006 and the latest April 2011, a week before Bin Ladin’s  death.

Management Trouble

Rather than a source of strength, Bin Ladin was burdened by what he viewed as  the incompetence of the “affiliates,” including their lack of political acumen  to win public support, their media campaigns and their poorly planned operations  which resulted in the unnecessary deaths of thousands of Muslims.

The documents show that some of the affiliates sought Bin Ladin’s blessing on  symbolic matters, such as declaring an Islamic state, and wanted a formal union  to acquire the al- Qa`ida brand. On the operational front, however, the  affiliates either did not consult with Bin Ladin or were not prepared to follow  his directives. Therefore, the framing of an “AQC” [Al Qaeda Central] as an  organization in control of regional “affiliates” reflects a conceptual  construction by outsiders rather than the messy reality of insiders.

If the criticisms of AQI [Al Qaeda in Iraq] in the documents are not  particularly surprising, the concerns Bin Ladin expressed about AQAP [Al Qaeda  in the Arabian Peninsula] will no doubt be revealing to many. It is widely  believed that AQAP is a success story from al-Qa`ida’s perspective, especially  since it is regularly described by senior U.S. government officials as the “most  dangerous” of al- Qa`ida’s affiliates. Yet the documents show that at least in  2010 Bin Ladin was far from being impressed with the  brothers in Yemen.” He  comes across as critical of both their words and deeds, in particular the  group’s attacks in Yemen, its lack of acumen to win the Yemeni people’s support,  and the ill-advised public statements of its leaders. In fact, with the possible  exception of AQI, none of the other “affiliates” appear to be more of a source  of concern for Bin Ladin than AQAP.

Not Friendly With Iran

Relations between al-Qa`ida and Iran appear to have been highly antagonistic,  and the documents provide evidence for the first time of al-Qa`ida’s covert  campaign against Iran. This battle appears to have been an attempt to influence  the indirect and unpleasant negotiations over the release of jihadis and their  families, including members of Bin Ladin’s family, detained by  Iran.

Pakistan

Unlike the explicit and relatively substantive references to the Iranian  regime, the documents do not have such references about Pakistan. Although there  are notes about “trusted Pakistani brothers,” there are no explicit references  to any institutional Pakistani support. The one instance Pakistani intelligence  is mentioned is not in a supporting role: in the course of giving detailed  instructions about the passage his released family from Iran should take, Bin  Ladin cautioned `Atiyya to be most careful about their movements lest they be  followed. More precisely, he remarked that “if the [Pakistani] intelligence  commander in the region is very alert, he would assume that they are heading to  my location and he would monitor them until they reach their destination.” This  reference does not suggest that Bin Ladin was on good terms with the Pakistani  intelligence community.

On Their Own

Rather than outright protection or assistance from states such as Iran or  Pakistan, Bin Ladin’s guidance suggests that the group’s leaders survived for as  long as they did due to their own caution and operational security protocols.  While the release of new documents may necessitate a reevaluation of al-Qa`ida’s  relations to Iran and Pakistan, the documents for now make it clear that  al-Qa`ida’s ties to Iran were the unpleasant byproduct of necessity, fueled by  mutual distrust and antagonism.

Arab Spring and the Final Letter

Bin Ladin’s last private letter is dated 25 April 2011. By then, events in  the world, as he was observing them on his television screen, were unfolding at  a pace that caused him to reassess his worldview. He saw the revolutions  sweeping the Arab world to represent a “formidable event” (hadath ha’il), a  turning point in the modern history of the umma. At the time he was writing, the  presidents of Tunisia and Egypt, Zein al-`Abidin bin `Ali and Husni Mubarak, had  fallen. Bin Ladin was convinced that their fall was bound to trigger a domino  effect, and “the fall of the remaining tyrants in the region was inevitable.” Thus, “if we double our efforts towards guiding, educating and warning Muslim  people from those [who might tempt them to settle for] half solutions, by  carefully presenting [our] advice, then the next phase will [witness a victory]  for Islam, if God so pleases.”

Conclusion: No Puppet Master

On the basis of the 17 declassified documents, Bin Ladin was not, as many  thought, the puppet master pulling the strings that set in motion jihadi groups  around the world. Far from being pleased with the actions of regional jihadi  groups claiming affiliation with or acting in the name of al-Qa`ida, Bin Ladin  was burdened by what he saw as their incompetence. Their lack of political  acumen to win public support along with their indiscriminate attacks resulting  in the deaths of many Muslims is a subject that dominates Bin Ladin’s private  letters composed in recent years.Bin Ladin was not even inspired by Inspire, AQAP’s English-language magazine  designed to appeal to Muslim Americans to launch random attacks in the United  States. He warned of its “dangerous consequences,” presumably due to its  tasteless content and no doubt to the poor planning of the operations it  promotes.In comparison to regional jihadi groups, Bin Ladin comes across as an  outmoded jihadi. In contrast to their indiscriminate jihad, he was more  interested in carefully planned operations.

http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2012/05/03/excerpts-the-bin-laden-letters-from-abbottabadreport/

The correspondence includes letters by then-second-in-command Abu Yahya al-Libi, taking Pakistani offshoot Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan to task over its indiscriminate attacks on Muslims. The Al-Qaeda leadership “threatened to take public measures unless we see from you serious and immediate practical and clear steps towards reforming (your ways) and dissociating yourself from these vile mistakes that violate Islamic Law,” al-Libi wrote. And bin Laden warned the leader of Yemeni AQAP, Nasir al-Wuhayshi, against attempting a takeover of Yemen to establish an Islamic state, instead saying he should “refocus his efforts on attacking the United States.” Bin Laden also seemed uninterested in recognising Somali-based al-Shabab when the group pledged loyalty to him because he thought its leaders were poor governors of the areas they controlled and were too strict with their administration of Islamic penalties, like cutting off the hands of thieves. The US said the letters reflect al-Qaeda’s relationship with Iran – a point of deep interest to the US government – as “not one of alliance, but of indirect and unpleasant negotiations” over some al-Qaeda terrorists and their families who were imprisoned in Iran. Nothing in the papers that were released points directly to alleged al-Qaeda sympathisers in Pakistan’s government, although presumably such references would have remained classified. Bin Laden described “trusted Pakistani brothers” but didn’t identify any Pakistani government or military officials who might have been aware or complicit in his hiding in Abbottabad. It wasn’t immediately clear how many of bin Laden’s documents the US was still keeping secret. In a note published with the 175 pages in Arabic that were released Thursday, along with English translations, retired General John Abizaid said they probably represent only a small fraction of materials taken from the compound in the US raid that tracked down and killed bin Laden in May 2011. The US said the documents span September 2006 to April 2011. Bin Laden was proud of the security measures that kept his family safe for many years, the report said. It said bin Laden boasted that his family “adhered to such strict measures, precluding his children from playing outdoors without the supervision of an adult who could keep their voices down.” The report said the Special Forces troops in the bin Laden raid were trained to search the home afterward for thumb drives, printed documents and what it described as “pocket litter” that might produce leads to other terrorists. “The end of the raid in Abbottabad was the beginning of a massive analytical effort,” it said. It said the personal files showed that, during one of the most significant manhunts in history, bin Laden was out of touch with the day-to-day operations of various terrorist groups inspired by Al-Qaeda. He was “not in sync on the operational level with its so-called affiliates,” researchers wrote. “Bin Laden enjoyed little control over either groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda in name or so-called fellow travellers.”

I want to remind them of the importance of the people’s first impression of who is addressing them, especially when he bears great responsibility. Since we carry the responsibility of a call that we want to deliver to the people, this takes care to find out what suits the people and the path from which you can reach them, deliver the faith to them, and convince them with it. Page 35 Part of this is to eliminate any strange appearance that will make them wonder and to adopt what they are used to, such as appearing in the media in true name, even if just a first name, and also appearing in Arab dress, as it is closer to the people than the dress of the people in these areas. (I also want to remind you that) people like short audio and video speeches and to disseminate what you can on the Internet. These are just opinions and I am open to your opinion. 15- You should send (a message) to the brothers in all the regions saying that a minimum of two brothers should be sent for suicide operations; they should not send a single suicide brother. We have experienced this in many operations where the percentage of success was very low, due to the psychological effects that overcome the brother in such cases. The most recent of which was the operation in which our brothers targeted the British Ambassador in Yemen, and one of our brothers, Allah have mercy on his soul, conducted it. Regardless of the heroism of the brother and his steadfastness, the psychological factors that affect the person in such cases necessitate the presence of a companion that will support and bolster him. Some people will say that some of the Prophet’s companions conducted operations alone. This is a very different example: They were not suicide operations, and that is where the big difference lies. 16- I asked Shaykh Sa’id, Allah have mercy on his soul, to task brother Ilyas to prepare two groups – one in Pakistan and the other in the Bagram area of Afghanistan – with the mission of Page 36 anticipating and spotting the visits of Obama or Petraeus to Afghanistan or Pakistan to target the aircraft of either one of them. They are not to target visits by US Vice President Biden,

Islamabad Tonight - 4th May 2012
Islamabad Tonight – 4th May 2012
Lt. Gen (R) Hameed Gul Former Chief ISItalking about “OBL Issue, Pak America Relations” in Islamabad Tonight with Nadeem Malik

Abbottabad Letter of Osama Bin Laden.pdf

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