Abbottabad Letters of Osama Bin Laden

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Abbottabad Letters of Osama Bin Laden

  Nadeem Malik

Osama Bin Laden’s Abbottabad Letter: Bin Ladin’s documents do not explicitly point to any institutional Pakistani support for Bin Ladin. Bin Ladin’s second main concern was to find alternative places outside Afghanistan and Pakistan to mount “external operations.”

Abbottabad Letter of Osama Bin Laden.pdf

In contrast to Bin Ladin’s public statements that focused on the injustice of those he believed to be the “enemies” (a`da’) of Muslims, namely corrupt “apostate” Muslim rulers and their Western “overseers,” the focus of his private letters is Muslims’ suffering at the hands of his jihadi “brothers” (ikhwa). He was at pains advising them to abort domestic attacks that cause Muslim civilian casualties and instead focus on the United States, “our desired goal.” Bin Ladin’s frustration with regional jihadi groups and his seeming inability to exercise control over their actions and public statements is the most compelling story to be told on the basis of the 17 declassified documents. The main points from each of the report’s four sections are briefly summarized below.

Nadeem Malik

Documents Found from Osama’s Abbottabad Home (Thought to be his speech etc.)

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IufW9thafQw http://youtu.be/IufW9thafQw

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3gQkT04vbys&feature=fvwrel

http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=endscreen&NR=1&v=779OY7IgCfE

Nadeem Malik

Pakistan

Unlike the explicit and relatively substantive references to the Iranian regime, the documents do not have such references about Pakistan. Although there are notes about “trusted Pakistani brothers,” there are no explicit references to any institutional Pakistani support. The one instance Pakistani intelligence is mentioned is not in a supporting role: in the course of giving detailed instructions about the passage his released family from Iran should take, Bin Ladin cautioned `Atiyya to be most careful about their movements lest they be followed. More precisely, he remarked that “if the [Pakistani] intelligence commander in the region is very alert, he would assume that they are heading to my location and he would monitor them until they reach their destination.”203 This reference does not suggest that Bin Ladin was on good terms with the Pakistani intelligence community. Another reference worth highlighting in this regard, is that Bin Ladin did not appear to enjoy freedom of movement with his family. In his long list of security measures to be followed by the “brothers” to evade the eyes of the authorities, he wrote to `Atiyya that it is most important not to allow children to leave the house except in emergency situations. For nine years prior to his death, Usama bin Ladin proudly told `Atiyya that he and his family adhered to such strict measures, precluding his children from playing outdoors without the supervision of an adult who could keep their voices down.204 Bin Ladin, it was said, could run but he could not hide. He seems to have done very little running and quite a lot of hiding. Rather than outright protection or assistance from states such as Iran or Pakistan, Bin Ladin’s guidance suggests that the group’s leaders survived for as long as they did due to their own caution and operational security protocols.205 While the release of new documents may necessitate a reevaluation of al-Qa`ida’s relations to Iran and Pakistan, the documents for now make it clear that al-Qa`ida’s ties to Iran were the unpleasant byproduct of necessity, fueled by mutual distrust and antagonism. The limited discussion of the Pakistani military does not lend itself to any final determination on ties between bin laden and Pakistani state or actors within it, but bin laden’s emphasis on security precautions suggests that fear and suspicion dominated his calculations.

Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden had a contentious and  troubled relationship with al Qaeda’s affiliates around the world,according to a  new study of documents seized during the raid on his compound one year ago.  Documents from the bin Laden compound reveal the al Qaeda leader’s frustration  with what he saw to be the incompetence of the affiliates, according to the  report by the Combating Terrorism Center at the U.S. Military Academy at West  Point.

Here are some excerpts from the report. The full report is posted here, and here are  the actual (translated) letters.

The Scope of the Report

It was reported that “thousands of items” were captured from Usama bin  Ladin’s compound during the Abbottabad raid. To date, however, only 17 documents  have been declassified and provided to the CTC, all of which are hereby released  with the publication of this report. They consist of electronic letters or draft  letters, totaling 175 pages in the original Arabic and 197 pages in the English  translation. They were written over several years. The earliest is dated  September 2006 and the latest April 2011, a week before Bin Ladin’s  death.

Management Trouble

Rather than a source of strength, Bin Ladin was burdened by what he viewed as  the incompetence of the “affiliates,” including their lack of political acumen  to win public support, their media campaigns and their poorly planned operations  which resulted in the unnecessary deaths of thousands of Muslims.

The documents show that some of the affiliates sought Bin Ladin’s blessing on  symbolic matters, such as declaring an Islamic state, and wanted a formal union  to acquire the al- Qa`ida brand. On the operational front, however, the  affiliates either did not consult with Bin Ladin or were not prepared to follow  his directives. Therefore, the framing of an “AQC” [Al Qaeda Central] as an  organization in control of regional “affiliates” reflects a conceptual  construction by outsiders rather than the messy reality of insiders.

If the criticisms of AQI [Al Qaeda in Iraq] in the documents are not  particularly surprising, the concerns Bin Ladin expressed about AQAP [Al Qaeda  in the Arabian Peninsula] will no doubt be revealing to many. It is widely  believed that AQAP is a success story from al-Qa`ida’s perspective, especially  since it is regularly described by senior U.S. government officials as the “most  dangerous” of al- Qa`ida’s affiliates. Yet the documents show that at least in  2010 Bin Ladin was far from being impressed with the  brothers in Yemen.” He  comes across as critical of both their words and deeds, in particular the  group’s attacks in Yemen, its lack of acumen to win the Yemeni people’s support,  and the ill-advised public statements of its leaders. In fact, with the possible  exception of AQI, none of the other “affiliates” appear to be more of a source  of concern for Bin Ladin than AQAP.

Not Friendly With Iran

Relations between al-Qa`ida and Iran appear to have been highly antagonistic,  and the documents provide evidence for the first time of al-Qa`ida’s covert  campaign against Iran. This battle appears to have been an attempt to influence  the indirect and unpleasant negotiations over the release of jihadis and their  families, including members of Bin Ladin’s family, detained by  Iran.

Pakistan

Unlike the explicit and relatively substantive references to the Iranian  regime, the documents do not have such references about Pakistan. Although there  are notes about “trusted Pakistani brothers,” there are no explicit references  to any institutional Pakistani support. The one instance Pakistani intelligence  is mentioned is not in a supporting role: in the course of giving detailed  instructions about the passage his released family from Iran should take, Bin  Ladin cautioned `Atiyya to be most careful about their movements lest they be  followed. More precisely, he remarked that “if the [Pakistani] intelligence  commander in the region is very alert, he would assume that they are heading to  my location and he would monitor them until they reach their destination.” This  reference does not suggest that Bin Ladin was on good terms with the Pakistani  intelligence community.

On Their Own

Rather than outright protection or assistance from states such as Iran or  Pakistan, Bin Ladin’s guidance suggests that the group’s leaders survived for as  long as they did due to their own caution and operational security protocols.  While the release of new documents may necessitate a reevaluation of al-Qa`ida’s  relations to Iran and Pakistan, the documents for now make it clear that  al-Qa`ida’s ties to Iran were the unpleasant byproduct of necessity, fueled by  mutual distrust and antagonism.

Arab Spring and the Final Letter

Bin Ladin’s last private letter is dated 25 April 2011. By then, events in  the world, as he was observing them on his television screen, were unfolding at  a pace that caused him to reassess his worldview. He saw the revolutions  sweeping the Arab world to represent a “formidable event” (hadath ha’il), a  turning point in the modern history of the umma. At the time he was writing, the  presidents of Tunisia and Egypt, Zein al-`Abidin bin `Ali and Husni Mubarak, had  fallen. Bin Ladin was convinced that their fall was bound to trigger a domino  effect, and “the fall of the remaining tyrants in the region was inevitable.” Thus, “if we double our efforts towards guiding, educating and warning Muslim  people from those [who might tempt them to settle for] half solutions, by  carefully presenting [our] advice, then the next phase will [witness a victory]  for Islam, if God so pleases.”

Conclusion: No Puppet Master

On the basis of the 17 declassified documents, Bin Ladin was not, as many  thought, the puppet master pulling the strings that set in motion jihadi groups  around the world. Far from being pleased with the actions of regional jihadi  groups claiming affiliation with or acting in the name of al-Qa`ida, Bin Ladin  was burdened by what he saw as their incompetence. Their lack of political  acumen to win public support along with their indiscriminate attacks resulting  in the deaths of many Muslims is a subject that dominates Bin Ladin’s private  letters composed in recent years.Bin Ladin was not even inspired by Inspire, AQAP’s English-language magazine  designed to appeal to Muslim Americans to launch random attacks in the United  States. He warned of its “dangerous consequences,” presumably due to its  tasteless content and no doubt to the poor planning of the operations it  promotes.In comparison to regional jihadi groups, Bin Ladin comes across as an  outmoded jihadi. In contrast to their indiscriminate jihad, he was more  interested in carefully planned operations.

http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2012/05/03/excerpts-the-bin-laden-letters-from-abbottabadreport/

The correspondence includes letters by then-second-in-command Abu Yahya al-Libi, taking Pakistani offshoot Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan to task over its indiscriminate attacks on Muslims. The Al-Qaeda leadership “threatened to take public measures unless we see from you serious and immediate practical and clear steps towards reforming (your ways) and dissociating yourself from these vile mistakes that violate Islamic Law,” al-Libi wrote. And bin Laden warned the leader of Yemeni AQAP, Nasir al-Wuhayshi, against attempting a takeover of Yemen to establish an Islamic state, instead saying he should “refocus his efforts on attacking the United States.” Bin Laden also seemed uninterested in recognising Somali-based al-Shabab when the group pledged loyalty to him because he thought its leaders were poor governors of the areas they controlled and were too strict with their administration of Islamic penalties, like cutting off the hands of thieves. The US said the letters reflect al-Qaeda’s relationship with Iran – a point of deep interest to the US government – as “not one of alliance, but of indirect and unpleasant negotiations” over some al-Qaeda terrorists and their families who were imprisoned in Iran. Nothing in the papers that were released points directly to alleged al-Qaeda sympathisers in Pakistan’s government, although presumably such references would have remained classified. Bin Laden described “trusted Pakistani brothers” but didn’t identify any Pakistani government or military officials who might have been aware or complicit in his hiding in Abbottabad. It wasn’t immediately clear how many of bin Laden’s documents the US was still keeping secret. In a note published with the 175 pages in Arabic that were released Thursday, along with English translations, retired General John Abizaid said they probably represent only a small fraction of materials taken from the compound in the US raid that tracked down and killed bin Laden in May 2011. The US said the documents span September 2006 to April 2011. Bin Laden was proud of the security measures that kept his family safe for many years, the report said. It said bin Laden boasted that his family “adhered to such strict measures, precluding his children from playing outdoors without the supervision of an adult who could keep their voices down.” The report said the Special Forces troops in the bin Laden raid were trained to search the home afterward for thumb drives, printed documents and what it described as “pocket litter” that might produce leads to other terrorists. “The end of the raid in Abbottabad was the beginning of a massive analytical effort,” it said. It said the personal files showed that, during one of the most significant manhunts in history, bin Laden was out of touch with the day-to-day operations of various terrorist groups inspired by Al-Qaeda. He was “not in sync on the operational level with its so-called affiliates,” researchers wrote. “Bin Laden enjoyed little control over either groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda in name or so-called fellow travellers.”

NADEEM MALIK

I want to remind them of the importance of the people’s first impression of who is addressing them, especially when he bears great responsibility. Since we carry the responsibility of a call that we want to deliver to the people, this takes care to find out what suits the people and the path from which you can reach them, deliver the faith to them, and convince them with it. Page 35 Part of this is to eliminate any strange appearance that will make them wonder and to adopt what they are used to, such as appearing in the media in true name, even if just a first name, and also appearing in Arab dress, as it is closer to the people than the dress of the people in these areas. (I also want to remind you that) people like short audio and video speeches and to disseminate what you can on the Internet. These are just opinions and I am open to your opinion. 15- You should send (a message) to the brothers in all the regions saying that a minimum of two brothers should be sent for suicide operations; they should not send a single suicide brother. We have experienced this in many operations where the percentage of success was very low, due to the psychological effects that overcome the brother in such cases. The most recent of which was the operation in which our brothers targeted the British Ambassador in Yemen, and one of our brothers, Allah have mercy on his soul, conducted it. Regardless of the heroism of the brother and his steadfastness, the psychological factors that affect the person in such cases necessitate the presence of a companion that will support and bolster him. Some people will say that some of the Prophet’s companions conducted operations alone. This is a very different example: They were not suicide operations, and that is where the big difference lies. 16- I asked Shaykh Sa’id, Allah have mercy on his soul, to task brother Ilyas to prepare two groups – one in Pakistan and the other in the Bagram area of Afghanistan – with the mission of Page 36 anticipating and spotting the visits of Obama or Petraeus to Afghanistan or Pakistan to target the aircraft of either one of them. They are not to target visits by US Vice President Biden,

Islamabad Tonight – 4th May 2012 Lt. Gen (R) Hameed Gul Former Chief ISItalking about “OBL Issue, Pak America Relations” in Islamabad Tonight with Nadeem Malik

NADEEM MALIK

Abbottabad Letter of Osama Bin Laden.pdf

Air Blue Crash Report By Civil Aviation Authority

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Air Blue Crash Report By Civil Aviation Authority

ائیر بلو کا حادثہ مکمل تحقیقاتی رپورٹ

سول ایوی ایشن اتھارٹی -طیارہ پائلٹ کی غفلت کے باعث حادثے کا شکار ہوا اور ڈیڑھ سو کے قریب قیمتی جانیں ضائع جہاز کی روانگی سے قبل پائلٹ کو بتایا گیا تھا کہ موسم خراب ہے لہذا ایسے حالات میں اڑان ٹھیک نہیں-حادثے سے چند منٹ قبل پائلٹ کو یہ بھی بتایا گیا تھا کہ وہ نو فلائی زون میں پرواز کر رہا ہے۔تفصیل کے مطابق اُس روز موسم خراب تھا اور تیز بارش ہو رہی تھی۔ کراچی سے آنے والی ایئربلیو کی اس پرواز سے قبل دو یا تین جہاز اترے بغیر اسلام آباد کی فضاء سے لوٹ چکے تھے۔طے شدہ اصول کے مطابق ایک ہزار فٹ کے فاصلے سے پائلٹ کو رن وے نظر آنا چاہیے۔ جب وہ اس پوزیشن میں آئے تو انہوں نے کنٹرول ٹاور کو بتایا کہ وہ رن وے کو دیکھ سکتے ہیں۔اس اعلان کے بعد اصولی طور پر جہاز کو تھوڑا سا دائیں مڑ کر رن وے کے برابر پہنچنا چاہیے اور اس کے بعد بائیں ہاتھ گھوم کر چالیس سیکنڈ سے ایک منٹ کے اندر رن وے کو چھو لینا چاہیے۔بارش کے باعث کنٹرول ٹاور کو جہاز دکھائی نہیں دے رہا تھا۔کنٹرول ٹاور نے جہاز کو بتایا کہ آپ کی پوزیشن ٹھیک نہیں لگ رہی۔ پائلٹ نے جواباً کہا کہ مجھے رن وے دکھائی دے رہا ہے۔رپورٹ کے مطابق پائلٹ نے تمام وارننگ اور طے شدہ طریقہ کار کو نظر انداز کرتے ہوے لینڈنگ کا فیصلہ کیا جس سے بنیادی غلطی ہوئی

During last 70 seconds from crash, despite calls from ATS and the EGPWS sounding 21 times as Terrain ahead including 15 times for pull up (extract of sound and alarms chronology is attached at Appendix-C), the Captain

continued to take the aircraft on its fatal journey. The First Offficer also informed the Captain 4 times about the terrain/Terrain Warnings and asked at least 3 times to pull up. But the Captain did not pull up, nor did he apply the TOGA (Take off Go Around), contrary to the SOPs.

The report concluded that the crash was a case of Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT),in which aircrew failed to display superior judgment and professional skills in a self-created unsafe environment.In their pursuit to land in inclement weather, they committed serious violations of procedures and breaches of flying discipline, which put the aircraft in an unsafe condition over dangerous terrain at low altitude.

Complete Report Attached in PDF Format

Air Blue Crash-Investigation Report -ABQ-202.pdf

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Siachen: Gayari Sector Tragedy-Let’s Hope for a Miracle

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Siachen: Gayari sector Tragedy

NADEEM MALIK

As many as 135 persons including 124 army soldiers and 11 civilians (paid out of def estb) of 6 Northern Light Infantry Battalion came under a huge snow slide early this morning in Gayari sector near Skardu. Snow slide is covering an area of 1 sq kilometer. This battalion headquarter is situated at same place for last 20 years and no incident of this nature has happened. However immediately after the incident Rescue efforts went in on. Sniffing dogs, helicopters and troops on ground are employed on rescue efforts.

سیاچن: فوج کے شعبہ تعلقات عامہ کے مطابق ابھی تک وہاں سے کسی زخمی یا ہلاک ہونے والے شخص کو نہیں نکالا گیا۔ برفانی تودے کو کاٹنے کے لیے مزید مشینری کو بھی علاقے میں بھجوا دیا گیا ہے۔پاکستانی فوج کےترجمان میجر جنرل اطہر عباس نے بی بی سی سے بات کرتے ہوئے بتایا کہ ان افراد کو ڈھونڈنے کے لیے کارروائیاں جاری ہیں اور موجودہ صورتحال میں ’اگر کوئی زندہ بچ گیا تو یہ ہماری خوش قسمتی ہو گی۔‘ان کا کہنا تھا کہ برفانی تودہ ایک مربع کلومیٹر وسیع اور ساٹھ سے اسی فٹ اونچا ہے تام مختلف اطراف سے …کھدائی کی جا رہی ہے۔ فوجی ذرائع کے مطابق برفانی تودے کا حُجم بہت بڑا ہے اس لیے اُسے کاٹنے میں وقت لگ سکتا ہے۔ذرائع نے کہا کہ آپریشن کے مکمل ہونےمیں کئی دن لگ سکتے ہیں کیونکہ جس علاقے میں یہ حادثہ پیش آیا ہے وہاں درجہ حرارت منفی ستر ڈگری سینٹی گریڈ تک گر سکتا ہے۔اس سے قبل میجر جنرل اطہر عباس نے بتایا کہ فوج کے جس صدر دفتر پر یہ برفانی تودہ گرا ہے وہ وہاں بیس سال سے قائم تھا اور ایسا واقعہ کبھی پہلے دیکھنے یا سننے میں نہیں آیا ہے۔فوجی حکام کا کہنا تھا کہ برفانی تودہ سنیچر کی صبح چھ بجے گرا اور اس کی زد میں ایک پورا بٹالین ہیڈ کوارٹر آ گیا۔ انہوں نے کہا کہ وقت کے اعتبار سے یہ حادثہ غیرمعمولی ہے کیونکہ برف کے تودے عموماً ایک گرم دن کے بعد شام کے وقت گرتے ہیں۔ بی بی سی [تصویر-میجر ذکاء الحق بھی گیاری سیکٹر میں موجود تھے جب برفانی تودے نے اُن کے ہیڈ کوارٹر کو آ لیا]

At least 240 Pakistani troops and civilians worked at the site of the disaster at the entrance to the Siachen Glacier with the aid of sniffer dogs and heavy machinery, said the army.
But they struggled to dig through some 25 meters (80 feet) of snow, boulders and mud that slid down the mountain early Saturday morning.
Pakistani army spokesman Gen. Athar Abbas said Sunday evening that it was unclear whether any of the people who were buried are still alive. At least 124 soldiers from the 6th Northern Light Infantry Battalion and 11 civilian contractors are missing.
”Miracles have been seen and trapped people were rescued after days … so the nation shall pray for the trapped soldiers,” Abbas said in an interview.
Pakistani army chief Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani visited the site Sunday to supervise rescue operations.
The US sent a team of eight experts to Islamabad to provide technical assistance, said the Pakistani army. Pakistan will consult with the team to determine what help is needed to expedite the rescue operation.
The avalanche in Siachen, which is on the northern tip of the divided Kashmir region claimed by both India and Pakistan, highlighted the risks of deploying troops to one of the most inhospitable places on earth.
The thousands of soldiers from both nations stationed there brave viciously cold temperatures, altitude sickness, high winds and isolation for months at a time.
Troops have been posted at elevations of up to 6,700 meters (22,000 feet) and have skirmished intermittently since 1984, though the area has been quiet since a cease-fire in 2003. The glacier is known as the world’s highest battlefield.
Abbas, the army spokesman, said the headquarters that was buried was located in an area previously believed to be safe. At an altitude of around 4,500 meters (15,000 feet), it is the main gateway through which troops and supplies pass on their way to more remote outposts.
More soldiers have died from the weather than combat on the glacier, which was uninhabited before troops moved there.
Conflict there began in 1984 when India occupied the heights of the 78-kilometer (49-mile)-long glacier. (Dawn)

Amountaineering expert Colonel Sher Khan disagreed. “There is no hope, there is no chance at all,” he told AFP.
“You can survive only in the first 5-10 minutes,” he said. “The casualties in avalanches occur due to pressure of heavy weight, extreme cold and lack of oxygen.” Apart from bulldozers and excavators, chemicals were being used to melt the ice. But due to harsh weather and great height, the rescue work is slow. The victims are trapped in one of the most unforgiving environments on the earth, at an altitude of 15,000 feet in the Karakoram mountain range.
Gen Kayani appreciated the morale and efforts of the troops who were braving harsh weather conditions and inhospitable terrain and directed the commanders to leave ‘no stone unturned’ to reach out to the trapped troops. He said that the calamity, in no way, should affect the morale of the troops defending their homeland at the world’s highest battlefield.
An eight-member team of US experts, meanwhile, arrived in Rawalpindi on Sunday to provide technical assistance in the rescue operation. According to a military statement, discussion will be held with the US team to find out the possibility and nature of assistance required to expedite the rescue operation. Offer of technical assistance from other friendly countries is also being considered. (Express Tribune)

Names of persons buried under snow slide in Gayari sector near Skardu.

Officers

1. PA-32596 Lt Col Tanvir Ul Hassan

2. PA-39548 Maj Zaka Ul Haq

3. PA-105358 Capt Haleem Ullah( AMC)

Junior Commission Officers

4. N/Sub Khurshid

5. N/Sub Didar

6. N/Sub Malik

7. N/Sub Iftikhar

Havildar

8. Hav Rehber

9. Hav Haji Shafayat

10. Hav Zakir

11. Hav Gulfraz

12. Hav Shah Nawaz

13. Hav Musadiq

14. Hav Rustam

15. Hav Shad

16. Hav Ghulam Muhammad

17. Hav Sher Nayab

18. Hav Ishaq

19. Hav Tanvir

Lance Havildar / NaiK

20. L/Hav Mustafa

21. L/Hav Ghulam Qadir

22. Nk Ashraf

23. Nk Sartaj

24. Nk Mudasar

25. Nk Jabbar

Lance Naik / Sepoy

26. Lnk Irshad

27. Lnk Sami Ullah

28. Lnk Sharafat

29. Lnk Mustafa

30. Lnk Himayat

31. Lnk Altaf

32. Lnk Mir Hussain

33. Lnk Irfan

34. Sep Ali Zar

35. Sep Saleem

36. Sep Malik Riaz

37. Sep Jamil

38. Sep Akhtar

39. Sep Nadir Wali

40. Sep Israr

41. Sep Sajid

42. Sep Naseer

43. Sep Dildar

44. Sep Zaman

45. Sep Irfan Khalil

46. Sep Waseem

47. Sep Ehsan

48. Sep Ashraf

49. Sep Riaz

50. Sep Shoaib

51. Sep Iqbal

52. Sep Mumtaz

53. Sep Haider

54. Sep Mehtab

55. Zulqarnain

56. Sep Ghulab Shah

57. Sep Rehmat Wali

58. Sep Nadeem

59. Sep Nafs Ali

60. Sep Nadeem Hashmi

61. Sep Qurban

62. Sep Muhammad Khan

63. Sep Akbar

64. Sep Ali Muhammad

65. Sep Muhammad Ali

66. Sep Amin

67. Sep Fiaz

68. Sep Shakeel

69. Sep Siraj

70. Sep Fazal Abbas

71. Sep Javed

72. Sep Javed

73. Sep Sakhi Zaman

74. Sep Sajjad Kazmi

75. Sep Fida Hussain

76. Sep Naeem

77. Sep Shamim

78. Sep Zakir

79. Sep Nisar Hussain

80. Sep Aurangzeb

81. Sep Arshad

82. Sep Sultan

83. Sep Muhammad Hussain

84. Sep Nasir

85. Sep Ilyas

86. Sep Mukhtiar

87. Sep Fida Hussain

88. Sep Zaheer

89. Sep Naseer

90. Sep Aftab

91. Sep Adil

92. Sep Muzamil

93. Sep Sarfraz

94. Sep Shameer

95. Sep Soba Khan

96. Sep Abid

97. Sep Ishaq

98. Sep Aksar Zaman

99. Sep Najeeb Ullah

100. Sep Siraj Ud Din

101. Sep Jaffar

102. Sep Ansar

103. Sep Ishaq

104. Sep Ghulam Rasool

105. Sep Muhammad Hussain

106. Sep Jumma khan

107. Sep Muhammad Ali

108. Sep Zakir Kawardo

109. Sep Ghulam Mehdi

110. Sep Ghazi Shah

111. Sep Sana Ullah

112. Sep Imtiaz

113. Sep Hameed Ullah

114. Sep Sadiq Gultri

115. Sep Gul Daz ( FS Sec)

Clerks

116. Nk / Clk Ghulam Nabi

117. Nk/ Clk Ghulam Ali

Cooks

118. Sep/Ck Muhammad Ali

119. Sep/Ck Karim

120. Sep/Ck Ghulam Mehdi

Sweepers

121. Moon Gul

122. Asif

123. Naveed

124. Ali

Civilian (paid out of defence establishment)

125. Jalil (Waiter)

126. Hameed ( Waiter)

127. Nasrullah (Barber)

128. Muhammad Ameer (Barber)

129. Waheed ( Canteen)

130. Azeem (Canteen)

131. Sarfraz (Dhobi)

132. Wali (Dhobi)

133. Noor Shah ali (Dhobi)

134. Sabir (Tailor)

135. Ghulam Rasool (NCB) – Uncfm/Suspected

For information regarding buried soldiers in snow slide in Gyari Sector, contact following helpline numbers:-
1. 05150932040,
2. 0515590212
3. 03215136525.
A helpline has also been established in Gilgit (Headquarter FCNA). Telephone numbers are:-
1. 05811920181
2. 05811920335.

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