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WIKILEAKS: What Our Leaders Tell
The Americans

WikiLeaks Pakistan

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WikiBites“Zardari asked for financial and development assistance from NATO
countries, adding with a rhetorical…
(5 hours ago) Today
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»

2006:
Suspicions of Mukhtaran Mai involvement in panchayat rulings against local
girls
ID: 71104 7/12/2006 13:41 Embassy Islamabad SECRET//NOFORN
ISLAMABAD 013376 SIPDIS E.O. 12958:…
(5 hours ago) Today
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more »

2008:
Education ministry spent $4m of $100m on madrassa reform in six years
ID: 141216 2/13/2008 13:44 Embassy Islamabad CONFIDENTIAL ISLAMABAD
000653 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL:…
(5 hours ago) Today
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more »

2006:
Waziristan political agents were not allowed to meet with army
ID:
53441 2/17/2006 13:08 Consulate Peshawar CONFIDENTIAL PESHAWAR 000082 SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: …
(5 hours ago) Today
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more »

WikiBites“[NWFP Chief Minister Ameer Haider Khan] Hoti praised the drone attacks,
calling the strikes ‘fantastic,’…
Yesterday
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»

2006:
Benazir, Shujaat meeting at Dubai wedding no coincidence
ID: 91199
12/29/2006 7:07 Embassy Islamabad CONFIDENTIAL ISLAMABAD 022643 SIPDIS E.O.
12958: DECL:…
Yesterday
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more »

2008:
US companies risked losing $1.8bn due to Pakistan govt’s ‘unfair practices’
ID: 138791 1/26/2008 3:55 Embassy Islamabad CONFIDENTIAL ISLAMABAD
000392 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL:…
Yesterday
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more »

2008:
Political scheming to get Zardari elected
ID: 167518 8/27/2008 12:03
08ISLAMABAD2850 Embassy Islamabad CONFIDENTIAL …
June 11, 2011 (2 days
ago)

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more »

2008:
Nawaz’s security fears after Benazir attack
ID: 136305 1/4/2008
11:45 08ISLAMABAD61 Embassy Islamabad CONFIDENTIAL …
June 11, 2011 (2
days ago)

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more »

2005:
US ambassador disagreed with Indian security official about Pakistan’s approach
to militancy
ID: 42163 10/6/2005 11:56 05NEWDELHI7795 Embassy New
Delhi SECRET …
June 11, 2011 (2 days ago)
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more »

2008:
Pakistan lost $2bn in violence following Benazir’s death
ID: 137441
1/16/2008 2:04 08ISLAMABAD228 Embassy Islamabad UNCLASSIFIED//FOR…
June
10, 2011 (3 days ago)

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more »

2008:
US, Singapore disagreed over “shipment of proliferation concern” to Pakistan
ID: 136947 1/11/2008 9:08 08SINGAPORE40 Embassy Singapore SECRET
08ANKARA16|08BERLIN14|08SINGAPORE13|08STATE1198|08STATE772 …
June 10,
2011 (3 days ago)

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more »

2007:
Fazlur Rehman wanted to meet Americans outside Pakistan
ID: 106645
5/3/2007 10:17 07NEWDELHI2117 Embassy New Delhi SECRET 07NEWDELHI2117

June 10, 2011 (3 days ago)
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2007:
Indian analysts claimed Pakistan engineered reduced infiltrations into Jammu
& Kashmir
107555 5/10/2007 13:15 07NEWDELHI2258 Embassy New
Delhi SECRET 07NEWDELHI2072 …
June 9, 2011 (4 days ago)
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more »

2007:
Western press exaggerated Musharraf’s weakness, curbs on protests
ID: 110340 5/31/2007 13:13 07ISLAMABAD2401 Embassy Islamabad SECRET

June 9, 2011 (4 days ago)
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more »

2010:
Military wanted special exemption from Pakistani passenger screening in US
ID: 245556 1/26/2010 14:51 10ISLAMABAD191 Embassy Islamabad CONFIDENTIAL

June 9, 2011 (4 days ago)
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2010:
India claimed its ‘strategic interests’ in Afghanistan threatened by
Pakistan
ID: 250219 2/23/2010 13:08 Embassy New Delhi CONFIDENTIAL
NEW DELHI 000334 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL:…
June 8, 2011 (5 days
ago)

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more »

2010:
US worried about Pakistan opposition to FMCT
ID: 250411 2/24/2010
10:44 Mission Geneva CONFIDENTIAL GENEVA 000023 SIPDISE.O. 12958:
DECL:…
June 8, 2011 (5 days ago)
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more »

2007:
Israel relations with India, China strengthened
ID: 134245
12/13/2007 17:41 Embassy Tel Aviv CONFIDENTIAL TEL AVIV 003517 SIPDIS E.O.
12958: DECL:…
June 8, 2011 (5 days ago)
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more »

2009:
US plan to engage international leaders on terrorist financing in Pakistan and
Afghanistan
ID: 242073 12/30/2009 13:28 09STATE131801 Secretary of
State SECRET//NOFORN …
June 7, 2011 (6 days ago)
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more »

2009:
China places three Pakistan-based individuals on terrorist list
ID:
213853 6/25/2009 8:24 09BEIJING1752 Embassy Beijing CONFIDENTIAL 09STATE65602

June 7, 2011 (6 days ago)
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more »

2009:
China wanted more information from India before placing LeT, JeM operatives on
terrorist list
ID: 221726 8/21/2009 9:11 09BEIJING2414 Embassy
Beijing CONFIDENTIAL 09STATE83156 …
June 7, 2011 (6 days
ago)

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more »

2010:
US urged China to place Pakistani-based operatives on terrorist list
ID: 244326 1/20/2010 8:53 10BEIJING148 Embassy Beijing CONFIDENTIAL
09BEIJING2848|09ISLAMABAD2570|09STATE103107|10STATE4664 …
June 7, 2011
(6 days ago)

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more »

2009:
Kabul admitted having 500 Baloch, Sindhi separatists in Afghanistan
ID: 221326 8/19/2009 3:41 09KABUL2421 Embassy Kabul SECRET 09KABUL2021

June 7, 2011 (6 days ago)
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2010:
US embassy pushed for Pakistan textiles in free-trade agreement
ID:
248393 2/11/2010 14:30 10ISLAMABAD332 Embassy Islamabad
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR…
June 7, 2011 (6 days ago)
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more »

2010:
US concerned about finance minister appointment
ID: 250600 2/25/2010
2:15 10ISLAMABAD444 Embassy Islamabad CONFIDENTIAL …
June 7, 2011 (6
days ago)

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more »

2008:
Ambassador sought to prevent soldier-militant swap
ID: 149905
4/15/2008 12:53 08ISLAMABAD1574 Embassy Islamabad SECRET …
June 6, 2011
(1 week ago)

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more »

2006:
Musharraf’s advisors sceptical of his Balochistan strategy
ID: 59142
4/3/2006 14:36 06ISLAMABAD5596 Embassy Islamabad SECRET …
June 6, 2011
(1 week ago)

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more »

2009:
Army’s role in long march conclusion
ID: 197040 3/16/2009 12:11
09ISLAMABAD559 Embassy Islamabad CONFIDENTIAL …
June 6, 2011 (1 week
ago)

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more »

2008:
Pervaiz Elahi wanted army to oppose Zardari’s presidency
ID: 166308
8/16/2008 4:50 08ISLAMABAD2736 Embassy Islamabad CONFIDENTIAL …
June 5,
2011 (2 weeks ago)

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more »

2007:
Pak government “crossed a red line” with missing people
ID: 95737
2/8/2007 8:05 07ISLAMABAD637 Embassy Islamabad CONFIDENTIAL …
June 5,
2011 (2 weeks ago)

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more »

2009:
US sought amendments to Anti-Terrorism Act
ID: 226441 9/23/2009 9:06
09ISLAMABAD2293 Embassy Islamabad SECRET
09ISLAMABAD2185|09ISLAMABAD2288|09PESHAWAR187 …
June 5, 2011 (2 weeks
ago)

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more »

2008:
US-Pakistan fight over media manipulation
ID: 136965 1/11/2008 10:24
08ISLAMABAD172 Embassy Islamabad CONFIDENTIAL …
June 3, 2011 (2 weeks
ago)

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more »

2008:
Nuclear security in-charge dismissed idea of “rogue officers” in Pak
military
ID: 142145 2/20/2008 12:28 08ISLAMABAD736 Embassy Islamabad
CONFIDENTIAL …
June 3, 2011 (2 weeks ago)
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more »

2006:
Islamabad, Beijing had differing views on Sino-Pak nuclear cooperation
ID: 76942 9/1/2006 11:15 06BEIJING18547 Embassy Beijing CONFIDENTIAL

June 3, 2011 (2 weeks ago)
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more »

2006:
US said no power sharing with Taliban
ID:87890 3/12/2006 06:38
Embassy Kabul CONFIDENTIAL 06KABUL5625SIPDISE.O. 12958:…
June 2, 2011
(2 weeks ago)

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more »

2007:
Kashmiris irate over custodial killings
id: 95785 date: 2/8/2007
12:50 refid: 07NEWDELHI636 origin: Embassy New Delhi classification: SECRET
destination: S…
June 2, 2011 (2 weeks ago)
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more »

2006:
Pak had no plan to talk to foreign militants
ID: 73464 02/08/2006
12:12 Consulate Peshawar CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 02 PESHAWAR
000413SIPDISE.O….
June 2, 2011 (2 weeks ago)
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more »

2005:
Indian national security advisor discusses Siachen, terrorism
ID:
32755 5/17/2005 12:24 05NEWDELHI3717 Embassy New Delhi
CONFIDENTIAL”This…
June 2, 2011 (2 weeks ago)
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more »

2005:
Indian navy chief visit to US
ID: 28301 3/8/2005 5:08 05NEWDELHI1764
Embassy New Delhi CONFIDENTIAL”This…
June 2, 2011 (2 weeks
ago)

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more »

2006:
US assessment of Indian position on Siachen
ID: 64523 5/18/2006
12:12 06NEWDELHI3466 Embassy New Delhi CONFIDENTIAL …
June 2, 2011 (2
weeks ago)

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more »

2006:
Pakistan expectations for Composite Dialogue
ID: 83679 10/31/2006
10:15 06ISLAMABAD21224 Embassy Islamabad SECRET//NOFORN …
June 2, 2011
(2 weeks ago)

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more »

2006:
Difficulty of resolving Siachen dispute
ID: 86738 11/22/2006 14:06
06NEWDELHI7954 Embassy New Delhi CONFIDENTIAL …
June 2, 2011 (2 weeks
ago)

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more »

2008:
Indian officials discuss relations with Pakistan with US Ambassador
ID: 168776 9/6/2008 5:37 08NEWDELHI2401 Embassy New Delhi CONFIDENTIAL

June 2, 2011 (2 weeks ago)
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more »

2007:
Crackdown on press freedom in Pakistan
ID: 111138 6/6/2007 14:40
07ISLAMABAD2526 Embassy Islamabad CONFIDENTIAL …
June 1, 2011 (2 weeks
ago)

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more »

2008:
US tries to improve Pakistan’s counterinsurgency capability
ID:
169980 9/16/2008 9:52 08ISLAMABAD3035 Embassy Islamabad CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN

June 1, 2011 (2 weeks ago)
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more »

2008:
US criticised major media group for irresponsible reporting
ID:
180281 11/26/2008 14:10 08ISLAMABAD3712 Embassy Islamabad
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR…
June 1, 2011 (2 weeks ago)
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more »

2009:
US seeks to expand radio transmission in Pakistan
ID: 223606
9/3/2009 16:07 09STATE91949 Secretary of State UNCLASSIFIED//FOR
OFFICIAL…
June 1, 2011 (2 weeks ago)
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more »

2009:
US considers journalist’s request for interview with Michelle Obama
ID: 225316 9/16/2009 7:26 09ISLAMABAD2236 Embassy Islamabad UNCLASSIFIED

June 1, 2011 (2 weeks ago)
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more »

2007:
Fazlur Rehman’s votes were “up for sale”
ID: 131658 11/27/2007 8:18
07ISLAMABAD5037 Embassy Islamabad CONFIDENTIAL …
June 1, 2011 (2 weeks
ago)

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more »

2007:
US protested “thuggish implementation” of Musharraf emergency
ID:
128587 11/4/2007 9:33 07ISLAMABAD4695 Embassy Islamabad SECRET//NOFORN

June 1, 2011 (2 weeks ago)
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more »

2010:
Saudi views on Afghan and Pakistani Taliban
ID: 245077 1/23/2010
12:21 10RIYADH101 Embassy Riyadh SECRET//NOFORN 09RIYADH1639|10RIYADH8

June 1, 2011 (2 weeks ago)
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more »

2008:
Amin Faheem sidelined by Zardari
ID: 1448623/7/2008 16:20 Embassy
Islamabad CONFIDENTIAL ISLAMABAD 001034 SIPDIS E.O. 12958:…
May 31,
2011 (2 weeks ago)

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more »

2008:
ISI asked Saudis to stop funding Nawaz`s campaign
ID: 141804
2/16/2008 6:37Embassy IslamabadCONFIDENTIALISLAMABAD
000691SIPDISE.O….
May 31, 2011 (2 weeks ago)
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more »

2007:
Babar Ghauri said May 12 violence killed MQM`s chances in Punjab
ID:
110728 6/4/2007 12:42Embassy IslamabadCONFIDENTIALISLAMABAD
002467SIPDISE.O….
May 31, 2011 (2 weeks ago)
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more »

2009:
US wanted to monitor passengers flying to and from Pakistan
ID:
2173077/20/2009 10:46Embassy IslamabadSECRETISLAMABAD 001642SIPDISE.O.
12958:…
May 31, 2011 (2 weeks ago)
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more »

2006:
Aftermath of Nawab Akbar Bugti’s death
76514 8/29/2006 12:36
06ISLAMABAD17014 Embassy Islamabad CONFIDENTIAL 06ISLAMABAD16944 …
May
30, 2011 (2 weeks ago)

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more »

2007:
Gen Musharraf on misconduct reference against CJ Iftikar Chaudhry
101935 3/26/2007 12:01 07ISLAMABAD1354 Embassy Islamabad CONFIDENTIAL

May 30, 2011 (2 weeks ago)
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more »

2006:
Political manoeuvring to amend Hudood Ordinance
79557 9/25/2006
11:38 06ISLAMABAD18917 Embassy Islamabad CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN …
May 30,
2011 (2 weeks ago)

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more »

2009:
Kashmir solution may end Pak establishment support to Taliban
226531
9/23/2009 15:09 09ISLAMABAD2295 Embassy Islamabad SECRET//NOFORN …
May
29, 2011 (3 weeks ago)

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more »

2008:
Musharraf debated dissolving parliament to save himself
163593
7/25/2008 13:26 08ISLAMABAD2524 Embassy Islamabad SECRET//NOFORN …
May
29, 2011 (3 weeks ago)

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more »

2007:
Govt was blocking access to Balochistan IDPs
92775 1/17/2007 11:03
07ISLAMABAD268 Embassy Islamabad CONFIDENTIAL 06ISLAMABAD16944 …
May
29, 2011 (3 weeks ago)

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more »

2008:
MQM told US ‘stop ignoring us’
ID: 139128 1/29/2008 13:36 Embassy
Islamabad CONFIDENTIAL ISLAMABAD 000421 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL:…
May
28, 2011 (3 weeks ago)

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more »

2009:
Friction between Taliban and Baloch
187784 1/20/2009 4:30
09KARACHI18 Consulate Karachi CONFIDENTIAL
08ISLAMABAD3533|08KARACHI339|08KARACHI472 …
May 28, 2011 (3 weeks
ago)

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more »

2006:
Who’s who in Balochistan
76491 8/29/2006 10:53 06ISLAMABAD16994
Embassy Islamabad CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN …
May 28, 2011 (3 weeks
ago)

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more »

2009:
US asks for Egypt’s support with Pakistan
240923 12/21/2009 11:54
09CAIRO2331 Embassy…
May 28, 2011 (3 weeks ago)
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more »

2009:
UK concerned about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons
226331 9/22/2009 14:13
09LONDON2198 Embassy London …
May 28, 2011 (3 weeks ago)
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more »

2010:
French official says Kayani manipulating govt from behind the scenes
245018 1/22/2010 17:44 10PARIS71 Embassy Paris SECRET//NOFORN

May 28, 2011 (3 weeks ago)
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more »

2009:
Nawaz cannot be trusted to honour his promises, says Mohammed bin Zayed
217654 7/22/2009 12:59 09ABUDHABI746 Embassy Abu Dhabi …
May
28, 2011 (3 weeks ago)

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more »

2010:
Pakistan’s concerns over Afghanistan should be considered
245077
1/23/2010 12:21 10RIYADH101 Embassy…
May 28, 2011 (3 weeks
ago)

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more »

2009:
France unsure over Pakistan’s nuclear security
223496 9/3/2009 9:16
09PARIS1203 Embassy Paris SECRET//NOFORN …
May 28, 2011 (3 weeks
ago)

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more »

2008:
General Kayani increases control with new military appointments
172986 10/8/2008 9:40 08ISLAMABAD3219 Embassy Islamabad …
May
27, 2011 (3 weeks ago)

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more »

2008:
Zardari claimed ISI was behind attack on his house
152299 5/4/2008
11:30 08ISLAMABAD1735 Embassy Islamabad …
May 27, 2011 (3 weeks
ago)

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more »

2007:
US “will not be sorry to see Makhdoom Ali Khan go”
117904 8/6/2007
11:53 07ISLAMABAD3424 Embassy Islamabad …
May 27, 2011 (3 weeks
ago)

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more »

2006:
JUI-F felt threatened by rising Taliban influence
69858 6/30/2006
4:14 06ISLAMABAD12391 Embassy Islamabad SECRET//NOFORN …
May 27, 2011
(3 weeks ago)

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more »

2008:
Zardari upset at ISI head Lt Gen Nadeem Taj
152299 5/4/2008 11:30
08ISLAMABAD1735 Embassy Islamabad CONFIDENTIAL 08ISLAMABAD1702 …
May
27, 2011 (3 weeks ago)

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more »

2008:
General Kayani transfers ‘recalcitrant’ Taj
172986 10/8/2008 9:40
08ISLAMABAD3219 Embassy Islamabad SECRET//NOFORN …
May 27, 2011 (3
weeks ago)

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more »

2009:
Kayani and Petraeus discuss politics, aid, military operations
188670 1/24/2009 12:28 09ISLAMABAD155 Embassy Islamabad …
May
26, 2011 (3 weeks ago)

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more »

2008:
Civilian-military tensions over Coalition Support Funds
146991
3/24/2008 11:30 08ISLAMABAD1269 Embassy Islamabad …
May 26, 2011 (3
weeks ago)

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more »

2007:
US concerned about inflated claims for Coalition Support Fund
134295
12/14/2007 4:56 07ISLAMABAD5266 Embassy Islamabad …
May 26, 2011 (3
weeks ago)

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more »

2005:
UAE upset over publicity of support to US military in Pakistan
32618
5/14/2005 9:00 05ABUDHABI2158 Embassy Abu Dhabi CONFIDENTIAL …
May 26,
2011 (3 weeks ago)

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more »

2007:
Fixing the CSF
134295 12/14/2007 4:56 07ISLAMABAD5266 Embassy
Islamabad …
May 26, 2011 (3 weeks ago)
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more »

2009:
Tarin asks Patterson to keep him informed of US funds to Pakistani military
233602 11/6/2009 14:52 09ISLAMABAD2698 Embassy Islamabad …
May
26, 2011 (3 weeks ago)

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more »

2009:
No CSF disbursement until Pakistani military accounts for expenditure
223755 9/4/2009 11:11 09ISLAMABAD2139 Embassy Islamabad …
May
26, 2011 (3 weeks ago)

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more »

2007:
Monitoring Pakistan’s Coalition Support Funds
114010 7/2/2007 7:25
07ISLAMABAD2873 Embassy Islamabad CONFIDENTIAL …
May 26, 2011 (3 weeks
ago)

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more »

2007:
`An unnecessarily dangerous situation`
134353 12/14/2007 10:14
07ISLAMABAD5283 Embassy Islamabad SECRET …
May 26, 2011 (3 weeks
ago)

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more »

2008:
President Zardari was willing to take heat of `cross-border raid`
172648 10/6/2008 10:20 08ISLAMABAD3186 Embassy Islamabad
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN …
May 26, 2011 (3 weeks ago)
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more »

2009:
Was Qaddafi funding Sipahe Sahaba?
197977 3/20/2009 10:51 09LAHORE54
Consulate Lahore SECRET “O 201051Z…
May 26, 2011 (3 weeks
ago)

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more »

2005:
Demarche on French firm’s assistance to Pakistan’s missile program(s)
25185 1/10/2005 17:42 05PARIS174 Embassy Paris SECRET//NOFORN
05SECSTATE270425…
May 25, 2011 (3 weeks ago)
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more »

2005:
Investigation on shipment to Pakistan
41910 10/4/2005 8:27
05TAIPEI4068 American Institute Taiwan,…
May 25, 2011 (3 weeks
ago)

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more »

2008:
Turkey: Considering action on Pakistan shipment, concerned about short lead
time
137269 1/14/2008 16:13 08ANKARA74 Embassy…
May 25,
2011 (3 weeks ago)

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more »

2009:
China informed of Chinese firm’s actions to provide Gyroscopes to Pakistan
238584 12/8/2009 7:33 09BEIJING3269 Embassy…
May 25, 2011 (3
weeks ago)

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more »

2008:
Zardari says would have given IAEA access to A Q Khan if he could
150415 4/18/2008 14:06 08ISLAMABAD1613 Embassy Islamabad …
May
25, 2011 (3 weeks ago)

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more »

2008:
Students and instructors at NDU have anti-US bias
153436 5/12/2008
12:36 08ISLAMABAD1825 Embassy Islamabad …
May 25, 2011 (3 weeks
ago)

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more »

2009:
Neutralising the A.Q. Khan threat?
190946 2/7/2009 15:33
09ISLAMABAD280 Embassy Islamabad SECRET 09ISLAMABAD267 …
May 25, 2011
(3 weeks ago)

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more »

2009:
F-16s come with strings attached
189129 1/28/2009 8:29
09ISLAMABAD177 Embassy Islamabad SECRET “VZCZCXRO6640 PP…
May 25, 2011
(3 weeks ago)

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more »

2008:
Pakistan campaigning for seat on UN Human Rights Council
153464
5/12/2008 14:07 08ISLAMABAD1832 Embassy Islamabad …
May 24, 2011 (3
weeks ago)

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more »

2005:
India proposes US observer status at Saarc
45425 11/17/2005 13:25
05NEWDELHI8749 Embassy New Delhi CONFIDENTIAL …
May 24, 2011 (3 weeks
ago)

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more »

2006:
John Bolton criticises Pakistan’s positions at the UN
66945 6/6/2006
21:54 06USUNNEWYORK1154 USUN New York CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN …
May 24,
2011 (3 weeks ago)

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more »

2010:
Zardari says India’s increased military spending threat to Pakistan
250192 2/23/2010 11:44 10ISLAMABAD428 Embassy Islamabad …
May
24, 2011 (3 weeks ago)

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more »

2010:
Holbrooke assures Krishna of US efforts to press Pakistan against LeT
246564 2/1/2010 16:01 10NEWDELHI206 Embassy New…
May 24, 2011
(3 weeks ago)

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more »

2009:
Taliban, LeT clearly regarded strategic assets by ‘some’ in Pakistan: Singh
211549 6/11/2009 17:48 09NEWDELHI1209 Embassy New Delhi …
May
24, 2011 (3 weeks ago)

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more »

2008:
Do not to allow Iran toehold in Pakistan: US
174700 10/22/2008 8:58
08ISLAMABAD3339 Embassy Islamabad …
May 24, 2011 (3 weeks
ago)

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more »

2008:
Zardari says govt without Nawaz would be weak
142183 2/20/2008 15:19
08ISLAMABAD745 Embassy Islamabad …
May 24, 2011 (3 weeks
ago)

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more »

2008:
Zardari, Nawaz agreed not to restore Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry
145093 3/10/2008 15:21 08ISLAMABAD1072 Embassy Islamabad …
May
24, 2011 (3 weeks ago)

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more »

2008:
Deactivating ISI`s `Political Wing`
180508 11/28/2008 12:56
08ISLAMABAD3717 Embassy Islamabad CONFIDENTIAL …
May 24, 2011 (3 weeks
ago)

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more »

2010:
India did not want nuclear Iran
250737 2/25/2010 12:56 10NEWDELHI355
Embassy New Delhi CONFIDENTIAL …
May 24, 2011 (3 weeks ago)
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more »

2010:
The growing US-India defence ties
248366 2/11/2010 13:07
10NEWDELHI287 Embassy New Delhi SECRET “VZCZCXYZ0007 OO…
May 24, 2011
(3 weeks ago)

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more »

2009:
US assessment of Karachi violence
203530 4/22/2009 11:52
09KARACHI138 Consulate Karachi …
May 23, 2011 (3 weeks ago)
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more »

2006:
ANP, PPP seek deal with Musharraf government
57538 3/22/2006 5:59
06ISLAMABAD4767 Embassy Islamabad SECRET …
May 23, 2011 (3 weeks
ago)

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more »

2009:
ANP on military’s deals with militants
215774 7/9/2009 4:08
09PESHAWAR144 Consulate Peshawar SECRET …
May 23, 2011 (3 weeks
ago)

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more »

2008:
ANP skeptical about South Waziristan deal
150498 4/19/2008 9:09
08ISLAMABAD1615 Embassy Islamabad …
May 23, 2011 (3 weeks
ago)

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more »

2006:
ANP seeks alliance with Musharraf
55435 3/6/2006 15:21 06PESHAWAR108
Consulate Peshawar CONFIDENTIAL …
May 23, 2011 (3 weeks ago)
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more »

2006:
US describes Fazlur Rehman as a “wolf in wolf’s clothing”
64728
5/19/2006 13:50 06NEWDELHI3506 Embassy New Delhi CONFIDENTIAL 06NEWDELHI3248

May 23, 2011 (3 weeks ago)
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more »

2006:
“Political drama” of Women’s Protection Bill
85897 11/16/2006 12:28
06ISLAMABAD22028 Embassy Islamabad SECRET//NOFORN …
May 23, 2011 (3
weeks ago)

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more »

2007:
Tariq Aziz tries to prevent Benazir Rawalpindi rally
129270
11/8/2007 12:38 07ISLAMABAD4793 Embassy Islamabad CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN

May 23, 2011 (3 weeks ago)
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more »

2008:
Extremist recruitment on the rise in south Punjab madrassahs
178082
11/13/2008 10:30 08LAHORE302 Consulate Lahore SECRET//NOFORN “ACTION SCA-00O
131030Z NOV…
May 22, 2011 (4 weeks ago)
Read
more »

2009:
Punjab Home Secretary fears Hafiz Saeed’s release
208236 5/22/2009
5:41 09LAHORE99 Consulate Lahore …
May 22, 2011 (4 weeks
ago)

Read
more »

2008:
Aziz prefers likable but weak Faheem over Zardari
141548 2/15/2008
4:12 08ISLAMABAD676 Embassy Islamabad SECRET 08ISLAMABAD549 “VZCZCXRO9025 OO
RUEHLH…
May 22, 2011 (4 weeks ago)
Read
more »

2009:
Southern Punjab extremism battle between haves and have-nots
230969
10/23/2009 3:49 09ISLAMABAD2576 Embassy Islamabad …
May 22, 2011 (4
weeks ago)

Read
more »

2008:
Before elections: Zardari upset over Faheem-Musharraf meeting
136099
1/2/2008 12:56 08ISLAMABAD9 Embassy Islamabad …
May 22, 2011 (4 weeks
ago)

Read
more »

2008:
Amin Faheem unprepared to become PM
139894 2/4/2008 12:55
08ISLAMABAD505 Embassy Islamabad …
May 22, 2011 (4 weeks
ago)

Read
more »

2007:
After October 18 blasts: Benazir did not permit police inside Bilawal House
128579 11/3/2007 16:52 07ISLAMABAD4692 Embassy Islamabad …
May
22, 2011 (4 weeks ago)

Read
more »

2008:
Ahmed Mukhtar preferred to become President or Petroleum Minister
143716 2/29/2008 14:28 08ISLAMABAD900 Embassy Islamabad …
May
22, 2011 (4 weeks ago)

Read
more »

2008:
Tariq Aziz advises Zardari against Shah Mehmood’s PM candidacy
143433 2/28/2008 11:09 08ISLAMABAD872 Embassy Islamabad CONFIDENTIAL
08ISLAMABAD691|08LAHORE698 “VZCZCXRO9625 OO…
May 22, 2011 (4 weeks
ago)

Read
more »

2007:
Patterson urges Tariq Aziz to provide for Benazir’s security
127495
10/27/2007 11:26 07ISLAMABAD4599 Embassy Islamabad …
May 22, 2011 (4
weeks ago)

Read
more »

2008:
Divisions developing within the PPP, Tariq Aziz tells Patterson
140318 2/7/2008 7:52 08ISLAMABAD549 Embassy Islamabad CONFIDENTIAL

May 22, 2011 (4 weeks ago)
Read
more »

2007:
Benazir asks Patterson for security assessment assistance
126768
10/23/2007 14:50 07ISLAMABAD4531 Embassy Islamabad …
May 22, 2011 (4
weeks ago)

Read
more »

2008:
Gilani proposed as alternative to Faheem for PM post
144160 3/4/2008
13:36 08ISLAMABAD970 Embassy Islamabad CONFIDENTIAL “VZCZCXRO4630 OO RUEHLH
RUEHPW DE…
May 22, 2011 (4 weeks ago)
Read
more »

1996:
Benazir Bhutto on plot to overthrow her government
833 7/14/1996
12:48 96ISLAMABAD5972 Embassy Islamabad SECRET …
May 22, 2011 (4 weeks
ago)

Read
more »

Kashmiri
leaders react to Pak pressure
59454 4/5/2006 13:09 Embassy Islamabad
SECRET ISLAMABAD 005767 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2016 TAGS:…
May
21, 2011 (4 weeks ago)

Read
more »

Nato
officials bewildered by ill-prepared Zardari
ID: 213661 6/24/2009
7:42 Mission USNATO CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN USNATO 000274 NOFORN SIPDIS
E.O….
May 21, 2011 (4 weeks ago)
Read
more »

Afghan
Border Police occupy Pak post
ID: 153438 5/12/2008 12:41 Embassy
Islamabad SECRET ISLAMABAD 001826 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/05/2028
TAGS:…
May 21, 2011 (4 weeks ago)
Read
more »

Details
of US military support for Pakistan
207373 5/17/2009 11:49
09ISLAMABAD1063 Embassy Islamabad …
May 21, 2011 (4 weeks
ago)

Read
more »

Nawaz
Sharif’s return to exile
121856 9/12/2007 6:31 07JEDDAH392
Consulate…
May 21, 2011 (4 weeks ago)
Read
more »

Page 10 of 12«
First
«89101112»

Pakistan Cables

more cables

Relief
account in PM’s name arouses suspicion

read
more

Cables
reveal role of US troops in Pakistan

US special operations forces were deployed with
Pakistani troops on joint operations on Pakistani territory by September 2009:
cables.

WIKILEAKS:
PAKISTAN

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NADEEM MALIK

Search:
Title
Release
Origin
Date
(SBU) PAKISTAN: UK URGES ELECTIONS WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT
DELAY
London Embassy London 12/31/2007
(SBU) NEW PAKISTAN COALITION POTENTIALLY UNSTABLE ACCORDING TO
FCO
London Embassy London 3/13/2008
AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN WHITE PAPER DELIVERED TO THE
UK
London Embassy London 3/30/2009
BIOSECURITY ENGAGEMENT PROGRAM: BALANCING PUBLIC HEALTH WITH
NATIONAL SECURITY IN PAKISTAN
Nuclear 911 Embassy Islamabad 02/09/08
CODEL LIEBERMANS MEETING WITH PAKISTAN COAS KAYANI 911 Embassy Islamabad 01/11/08
CONSERVATIVE PARTY LEADER ON AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN London Embassy London 04/09/09
EDELMAN AND MOD HOLD PAKISTAN ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION MAY
30
London Embassy London 06/04/08
EU-PAKISTAN SUMMIT: DELIVERABLES ON TRADE IDPS GSP PLUS AND
SECURITY COOPERATION
London Embassy London 06/12/09
EU/PAKISTAN: HMG REQUESTS USG INFLUENCE THE SWEDES TO MAKE
PAKISTAN A PRIORITY
London Embassy London 12/02/08
HMG PRAISES U.S. AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN STRATEGY PREPARES FOR
JANUARY CONFERENCE
911 Embassy London 12/02/09
HMG VIEWS SITUATION IN PAKISTAN AS BETTER THAN EXPECTED; DESCRIBES
NEW PM AS SOLID
London Embassy London 04/02/08
HMGS VIEWS ON INDIAS RELATIONSHIP WITH PAKISTAN AND
NEPAL
London Embassy London 08/03/09
LIBYAN RESPONSE TO POTUS AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN
STRATEGY
Libya Embassy Tripoli 12/03/09
LUTE DELEGATIONS DISCUSSIONS ON AFGHANISTAN AND
PAKISTAN
London Embassy London 9/22/2008
PAKISTAN: LYALL GRANT AND BOUCHER AGREE ON PAKISTAN
FOCUS
London Embassy London 12/08/08
PAKISTAN: MILIBAND VISIT TO FOCUS ON INDO-PAK RELATIONS AND FATA
ROADMAP
London Embassy London 01/12/09
PAKISTAN: MILIBANDS POSITIVE NOVEMBER 25 VISIT London Embassy London 11/28/2008
PAKISTAN: NEXT STEPS AFTER MILIBANDS VISIT London Embassy London 1/27/2009
PAKISTAN: UK APPRECIATES USG APPROACH TO TOKYO DONORS
CONFERENCE
London Embassy London 3/16/2009
PAKISTAN: UK ASSESSMENT AND MEDIUM-TERM THINKING SUPPORT FOR
FRIENDS OF PAKISTAN GROUP
London Embassy London 09/04/08
PAKISTAN: UK CONSIDERING SUPPORT FOR IDPS London Embassy London 3/13/2009
PAKISTAN: UK ON FATA INTEGRATION AF-PAK RELATIONS EU TRADE AND
ZARDARI
London Embassy London 11/13/2008
PAKISTAN: UK ON MID-DECEMBER DONORS CONFERENCE London Embassy London 11/28/2008
PAKISTAN: UK SEES KASHMIR SOLUTION AS KEY TO LONG-TERM SECURITY
COOPERATION
London Embassy London 7/18/2008
PAKISTAN: UK SEES MUSHARRAFS DEPARTURE AS A GOOD THING BUT NOT A
SOLUTION
London Embassy London 8/19/2008
PAKISTAN: UK VIEWS ON DEALS WITH TRIBAL GROUPS IN THE
FATA
London Embassy London 06/06/08
REPORTS THAT BRITAIN IS IMPORTING PAKISTANI IMAMS ARE
EXAGGERATED
London Embassy London 4/24/2008
UK FULLY SUPPORTS FRIENDS OF PAKISTAN London Embassy London 10/20/2008
USUN AMB KHALILZAD REVIEWS IRAQ AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN AND IRAN WITH
UK OFFICIALS
London Embassy London 06/12/08
Title Release Origin Date

Title
Release
Origin
Date
(SBU) PAKISTAN: UK URGES ELECTIONS WITHOUTSIGNIFICANT DELAY London Embassy London 12/31/2007
(SBU) NEW PAKISTAN COALITION POTENTIALLYUNSTABLE ACCORDING TO FCO London Embassy London 3/13/2008
AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN WHITE PAPER DELIVEREDTO THE UK London Embassy London 3/30/2009
BIOSECURITY ENGAGEMENT PROGRAM: BALANCINGPUBLIC HEALTH WITH NATIONAL SECURITY IN PAKISTAN Nuclear 911 Embassy Islamabad 02/09/08
CODEL LIEBERMANS MEETING WITH PAKISTAN COASKAYANI 911 Embassy Islamabad 01/11/08
CONSERVATIVE PARTY LEADER ONAFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN London Embassy London 04/09/09
EDELMAN AND MOD HOLD PAKISTAN ROUNDTABLEDISCUSSION MAY 30 London Embassy London 06/04/08
EU-PAKISTAN SUMMIT: DELIVERABLES ON TRADE IDPSGSP PLUS AND SECURITY COOPERATION London Embassy London 06/12/09
EU/PAKISTAN: HMG REQUESTS USG INFLUENCE THESWEDES TO MAKE PAKISTAN A PRIORITY London Embassy London 12/02/08
HMG PRAISES U.S. AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTANSTRATEGY PREPARES FOR JANUARY CONFERENCE 911 Embassy London 12/02/09
HMG VIEWS SITUATION IN PAKISTAN AS BETTER THANEXPECTED; DESCRIBES NEW PM AS SOLID London Embassy London 04/02/08
HMGS VIEWS ON INDIAS RELATIONSHIP WITHPAKISTAN AND NEPAL London Embassy London 08/03/09
LIBYAN RESPONSE TO POTUS AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTANSTRATEGY Libya Embassy Tripoli 12/03/09
LUTE DELEGATIONS DISCUSSIONS ON AFGHANISTANAND PAKISTAN London Embassy London 9/22/2008
PAKISTAN: LYALL GRANT AND BOUCHER AGREE ONPAKISTAN FOCUS London Embassy London 12/08/08
PAKISTAN: MILIBAND VISIT TO FOCUS ON INDO-PAKRELATIONS AND FATA ROADMAP London Embassy London 01/12/09
PAKISTAN: MILIBANDS POSITIVE NOVEMBER 25VISIT London Embassy London 11/28/2008
PAKISTAN: NEXT STEPS AFTER MILIBANDSVISIT London Embassy London 1/27/2009
PAKISTAN: UK APPRECIATES USG APPROACH TO TOKYODONORS CONFERENCE London Embassy London 3/16/2009
PAKISTAN: UK ASSESSMENT AND MEDIUM-TERMTHINKING SUPPORT FOR FRIENDS OF PAKISTAN GROUP London Embassy London 09/04/08
PAKISTAN: UK CONSIDERING SUPPORT FORIDPS London Embassy London 3/13/2009
PAKISTAN: UK ON FATA INTEGRATION AF-PAKRELATIONS EU TRADE AND ZARDARI London Embassy London 11/13/2008
PAKISTAN: UK ON MID-DECEMBER DONORSCONFERENCE London Embassy London 11/28/2008
PAKISTAN: UK SEES KASHMIR SOLUTION AS KEY TOLONG-TERM SECURITY COOPERATION London Embassy London 7/18/2008
PAKISTAN: UK SEES MUSHARRAFS DEPARTURE AS AGOOD THING BUT NOT A SOLUTION London Embassy London 8/19/2008
PAKISTAN: UK VIEWS ON DEALS WITH TRIBAL GROUPSIN THE FATA London Embassy London 06/06/08
REPORTS THAT BRITAIN IS IMPORTING PAKISTANIIMAMS ARE EXAGGERATED London Embassy London 4/24/2008
UK FULLY SUPPORTS FRIENDS OFPAKISTAN London Embassy London 10/20/2008
USUN AMB KHALILZAD REVIEWS IRAQ AFGHANISTANPAKISTAN AND IRAN WITH UK OFFICIALS London Embassy London 06/12/08

Showing 1 to 29 of 29 entries (filtered from 1,233 total entries)

Title Release Origin Date
Title
Release
Origin
Date
BIOSECURITY ENGAGEMENT PROGRAM: BALANCINGPUBLIC HEALTH WITH NATIONAL SECURITY IN PAKISTAN Nuclear 911 Embassy Islamabad 02/09/08
CODEL LIEBERMANS MEETING WITH PAKISTAN COASKAYANI 911 Embassy Islamabad 01/11/08
CODELS LEVIN AND CASEY DISCUSS BORDER SECURITYAND AID WITH PM GILANI 911 Embassy Islamabad 06/05/08
INTERIOR MINISTER REHMAN MALIKS SEPTEMBER 7MEETING WITH CODEL SMITH 911 Embassy Islamabad 09/10/09
SCENESETTER FOR NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISORJONES Nuclear 911 Embassy Islamabad 6/20/2009

Showing 1 to 5 of 5 entries (filtered from 1,233 total entries)

Title Release Origin Date

PAKISTAN: UK SEES MUSHARRAFS DEPARTURE AS A GOOD
THING BUT NOT A
SOLUTION

Title
Release
Origin
Date
(SBU) PAKISTAN: UK URGES ELECTIONS WITHOUTSIGNIFICANT DELAY London Embassy London 12/31/2007
(SBU) NEW PAKISTAN COALITION POTENTIALLYUNSTABLE ACCORDING TO FCO London Embassy London 3/13/2008
AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN WHITE PAPER DELIVEREDTO THE UK London Embassy London 3/30/2009
BIOSECURITY ENGAGEMENT PROGRAM: BALANCINGPUBLIC HEALTH WITH NATIONAL SECURITY IN PAKISTAN Nuclear 911 Embassy Islamabad 02/09/08
CODEL LIEBERMANS MEETING WITH PAKISTAN COASKAYANI 911 Embassy Islamabad 01/11/08
CONSERVATIVE PARTY LEADER ONAFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN London Embassy London 04/09/09
EDELMAN AND MOD HOLD PAKISTAN ROUNDTABLEDISCUSSION MAY 30 London Embassy London 06/04/08
EU-PAKISTAN SUMMIT: DELIVERABLES ON TRADE IDPSGSP PLUS AND SECURITY COOPERATION London Embassy London 06/12/09
EU/PAKISTAN: HMG REQUESTS USG INFLUENCE THESWEDES TO MAKE PAKISTAN A PRIORITY London Embassy London 12/02/08
HMG PRAISES U.S. AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTANSTRATEGY PREPARES FOR JANUARY CONFERENCE 911 Embassy London 12/02/09
HMG VIEWS SITUATION IN PAKISTAN AS BETTER THANEXPECTED; DESCRIBES NEW PM AS SOLID London Embassy London 04/02/08
HMGS VIEWS ON INDIAS RELATIONSHIP WITHPAKISTAN AND NEPAL London Embassy London 08/03/09
LIBYAN RESPONSE TO POTUS AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTANSTRATEGY Libya Embassy Tripoli 12/03/09
LUTE DELEGATIONS DISCUSSIONS ON AFGHANISTANAND PAKISTAN London Embassy London 9/22/2008
PAKISTAN: LYALL GRANT AND BOUCHER AGREE ONPAKISTAN FOCUS London Embassy London 12/08/08
PAKISTAN: MILIBAND VISIT TO FOCUS ON INDO-PAKRELATIONS AND FATA ROADMAP London Embassy London 01/12/09
PAKISTAN: MILIBANDS POSITIVE NOVEMBER 25VISIT London Embassy London 11/28/2008
PAKISTAN: NEXT STEPS AFTER MILIBANDSVISIT London Embassy London 1/27/2009
PAKISTAN: UK APPRECIATES USG APPROACH TO TOKYODONORS CONFERENCE London Embassy London 3/16/2009
PAKISTAN: UK ASSESSMENT AND MEDIUM-TERMTHINKING SUPPORT FOR FRIENDS OF PAKISTAN GROUP London Embassy London 09/04/08
PAKISTAN: UK CONSIDERING SUPPORT FORIDPS London Embassy London 3/13/2009
PAKISTAN: UK ON FATA INTEGRATION AF-PAKRELATIONS EU TRADE AND ZARDARI London Embassy London 11/13/2008
PAKISTAN: UK ON MID-DECEMBER DONORSCONFERENCE London Embassy London 11/28/2008
PAKISTAN: UK SEES KASHMIR SOLUTION AS KEY TOLONG-TERM SECURITY COOPERATION London Embassy London 7/18/2008
PAKISTAN: UK SEES MUSHARRAFS DEPARTURE AS AGOOD THING BUT NOT A SOLUTION London Embassy London 8/19/2008
PAKISTAN: UK VIEWS ON DEALS WITH TRIBAL GROUPSIN THE FATA London Embassy London 06/06/08
REPORTS THAT BRITAIN IS IMPORTING PAKISTANIIMAMS ARE EXAGGERATED London Embassy London 4/24/2008
UK FULLY SUPPORTS FRIENDS OFPAKISTAN London Embassy London 10/20/2008
UK PRIME MINISTER BROWN VISITS HELMAND;WELCOMES ANSF FOCUS AND SEEKS METRICS TO MEASURE WAR EFFORT Afghanistan Embassy Kabul 9/16/2009
USUN AMB KHALILZAD REVIEWS IRAQ AFGHANISTANPAKISTAN AND IRAN WITH UK OFFICIALS London Embassy London 06/12/08

WIKILEAKS: US FOOTPRINT IN
PAKISTAN

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[US direct assistance to on-ground Pakistan military
forces]

229065 10/9/2009 7:25 09ISLAMABAD2449 Embassy Islamabad SECRET
09ISLAMABAD2116 “VZCZCXRO6340 OO RUEHLH RUEHPW

DE RUEHIL #2449/01 2820725
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 090725Z OCT
09
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5243
INFO
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0970
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1467
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY
NEW DELHI 5555
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI 2344
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE
7946
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR 6977
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON
DC
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON
DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC

RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL “ “S E C R E T SECTION 01
OF 02 ISLAMABAD 002449 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2034

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, MOPS, PK SUBJECT: (S) PAKISTAN ARMY GHQ
AGAIN APPROVES EMBEDDING

U.S. SPECIAL FORCES PERSONNEL TO SUPPORT MILITARY
OPERATIONS

REF: ISLAMABAD 2116

Classified By: Ambassador Anne W. Patterson, Reasons 1.4
(a)(b)(c), and (d)

1. (S) Summary: The Pakistani Army has for just the second time
approved deployment of U.S. special operation elements to support Pakistani
military operations. The first deployment, with SOC(FWD)-PAK elements embedded
with the Frontier Corps in Bajaur Agency, occurred in September (reftel).
Previously, the Pakistani military leadership adamantly opposed letting us embed
our special operations personnel with their military forces. The developments of
the past two months thus appear to represent a sea change in their thinking. End
Summary.

2. (S) Pakistan Army General Headquarters (GHQ) informed ODRP
that it approved a request from the Army’s 11 Corps Commander, Lt. General
Masood Aslam, for U.S. SOC(FWD)-PAK personnel to deploy to Wana, South
Waziristan and Miram Shah, North Waziristan, in the FATA, in order to provide
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support and general
operational advice to the 11 Corps’ 9th and 7th Divisions. The 11 Corps had
informally approached ODRP about our providing such support approximately one
week ago; ODRP responded positively.

3. (S) SOC(FWD)-PAK support to 11 Corps would be at the
division-level and would include a live downlink of unmanned aerial vehicle
(UAV) full motion video. SOC(FWD)-PAK’s initial CONOPs envision deployment of
six personnel each to Wana and Miram Shah. In order to finalize our planning and
obtain formal go-ahead from CENTCOM, ODRP has requested additional information
on the timing and purpose of the 11 Corps’ planned military operations from
Brigadier General Amjad Shabbir, the Army’s Director General of Military
Operations (DGMO).

4. (S) This is just the second time that GHQ has approved
deployment of U.S. special operations elements to support Pakistani military
operations. In September 2009, four SOC(FWD)-PAK personnel who were embedded
with the Frontier Corps (FC) at Khar Fort, in Bajaur Agency in the FATA,
provided ISR for an FC operation (reftel). This support was highly successful,
enabling the FC to execute a precise and effective artillery strike on an enemy
location.

5. (S) In recent days, the FC informally approached ODRP for a
repeat deployment of SOC(FWD)-PAK personnel to Khar Fort. SOC(FWD)-PAK is
preparing a CONOP while the FC obtains approval from GHQ.

6. (S) Comment: U.S. special operation elements have been in
Pakistan for more than a year, but were largely limited to a training role. The
Pakistani Army leadership previously adamantly opposed letting us embed U.S.
Special Operations Forces (SOF) with their military forces to support their
operations. The recent approval by GHQ — almost certainly with the personal
consent of Chief of Army Staff General Kayani — for SOC(FWD)-PAK deployments to
Bajaur and the Waziristans appears to represent a sea change in Pakistani
thinking. Patient relationship-building with the military is the key factor that
has brought us to this point. The Pakistanis are increasingly confident that we
do not have ulterior motives in assisting their operations. In addition, the
direct recipients of SOC(FWD)-PAK training appear to have recognized the
potential benefits of bringing U.S. SOF personnel into the field with them for
operational advice and other support. In addition, the success of the initial
deployment to Khar Fort likely helped catalyze the follow-up requests for new
and repeat support.

7. (S) Comment Continued: These deployments are highly
politically sensitive because of widely-held concerns among the public about
Pakistani sovereignty and opposition to allowing foreign military forces to
operate in any fashion on Pakistani soil. Should these developments and/or
related matters receive any coverage in the Pakistani or U.S. media, the
Pakistani military will likely stop making requests for such
assistance.

End Comment.

ISLAMABAD 00002449 002 OF 002 PATTERSON

http://www.dawn.com/2011/05/20/us-direct-assistance-to-on-ground-pakistan-military-forces.html

Admiral Mullen requests a third “Restricted Operating Zone” for
US aircraft over FATA


//

[Admiral Mullen requests a third “Restricted Operating Zone” for
US aircraft over FATA]
147015 3/24/2008 13:59 08ISLAMABAD1272 Embassy
Islamabad CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN “VZCZCXRO2815
PP RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHIL
#1272/01 0841359
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 241359Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY
ISLAMABAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6061
INFO RUEHKP/AMCONSUL
KARACHI PRIORITY 9351
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 5148
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL
PESHAWAR PRIORITY 3845
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHWSMRC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB
FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM
MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY” “C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD
001272

SIPDIS

NOFORN

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2028

TAGS: MARR, MASS, PGOV, PK, PREL

SUBJECT: CJCS MULLEN’S MEETING WITH COAS GENERAL
KAYANI

Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)

(d)

1. (C) Summary: CJCS Mullen met with Pakistan’s Chief of the
Army Staff General Ashfaq Kayani twice March 3-4. At a private dinner on March
3, they engaged in a discussion of Pakistan’s new political landscape in the
aftermath of the February 18 parliamentary elections. During talks on March 4,
Admiral Mullen briefed Kayani on the impact of U.S. domestic politics on our
defense ties and engaged in a broad exchange on several important bilateral
security issues. Admiral Mullen’s visit, the second in less than a month, was
intended to demonstrate the U.S. government’s conviction to deepen our
engagement with senior Pakistani officials. End Summary

2. (C) Admiral Mullen, Lieutenant General Carter Ham, J3 Joint
Staff and Major General James R. Helmly visited General Kayani’s house for a
private dinner on March 3. Kayani began by providing a thorough explanation of
the political situation including an analysis of the ongoing negotiations over
the makeup of the incoming government and a description of the major political
players. The General acknowledged the stated desire of some newly ascendant
politicians to impeach President Musharraf but said he did not think these
efforts would succeed. Discussing the military budget Kayani acknowledged it had
been controlled and “”protected”” by President Musharraf in the past but that it
would now be exposed to the parliament and he was ready to “”appear in public to
defend it.”” After discussing national politics Kayani transitioned into a
discussion of the unique culture and history of Pakistan’s FATA. He explained
how the legacy of the Frontier Crimes Regulation and the corresponding role of
the Pashtun Tribal Code impacted the FATA’s system of governance.

3. (C) On March 4, Admiral Mullen and General Kayani met again
focusing their discussions on bilateral military ties. They were joined by
Lieutenant General Carter Ham and Major General James R. Helmly for the U.S.
side and Lieutenant General Satthar, Chief of the General Staff; Major General
Ahmad Shuja Pasha, Director General Military Operations (DGMO); Major General
Nadeem Ijaz, Director General Military Intelligence; and Brigadier Zubair,
Personal Secretary to the Chief of the Army Staff.

4. (C) Admiral Mullen began by telling Kayani that a U.S. SIGINT
team had completed its initial assessment of Pakistan’s requirements and that
they intended to propose options to assist them in developing a solution.
Admiral Mullen then asked Kayani for his help in approving a third Restricted
Operating Zone for U.S. aircraft over the FATA. Regarding the FATA, Kayani spoke
of a “”long range campaign plan”” to deal with Baitullah Mehsud although he
provided no particulars. Kayani gave the impression that his strategy would
focus on a defensive campaign for the foreseeable future. This campaign would
include the initiation of discrete offensive operations in response to militant
provocations so as to protect his forces and blunt tactical threats.

5. (C) He explained that his intent was not to “”hand the
incoming government a problem”” but rather “”a stable situation.”” Kayani
indicated he understood the frailty of the new government and the need to
prevent near-term challenges to it. The U.S. interlocutors impressed upon Kayani
to advise the incoming government of the need to take responsibility for
combating militancy rather than continuing to engage in rhetoric. Kayani said he
needed the U.S. Ambassador to encourage those who might become Prime Minister to
“”establish the position and take responsibility.””

6. (C) Kayani said statements in the Western press regarding the
deployment of U.S. trainers to Pakistan cast the Army in a poor light. He
acknowledged the need for American assistance but cautioned that it could not be
publicized because it implied that the Pakistani Army was not capable of facing
down the militant threat. He emphasized that he needed Admiral Mullen’s help to
“”manage perceptions”” and that he would like the U.S. to provide train the
trainer types of assistance so that these responsibilities would ultimately
shift to the Pakistan Army.

7. (C) Admiral Mullen raised the issue of Coalition Support
Funds (CSF). Admiral Mullen told Kayani that the

ISLAMABAD 00001272 002 OF 002

U.S. goal was to move forward and that his help was needed in
finding the best way ahead on this program. Kayani replied that the “”UN model””
for reimbursements served as a useful baseline for reforming CSF. As to the
performance of the program Kayani explained that the money went to the GOP but
that the Army only received a “”small percentage.”” This was likely due to the
fact that there are no formal mechanisms for ensuring that the reimbursements
reach the Army.

8. (C) As to allegations that claims are inflated, Kayani said
the U.S. should recognize that not all of the Army’s costs are claimed and that
it would be easier to account for if we could come to agreement on the types of
costs that would be reimbursed. He also indicated that he was aware that there
are some in the U.S. Congress that preferred an in kind reimbursement as opposed
to a cash transfer. Kayani reminded Admiral Mullen that the “”delay”” in
processing reimbursement claims is a problem that requires
resolution.

9. (C) Kayani said that the U.S. effort to build the
counterinsurgency skills of the FC through the implementation Security
Development Plan “”makes sense”” and that improving its capabilities would help
counter the spread of militant activity in the FATA. Kayani went on to explain
that the Frontier Corps had certain discreet qualities that gave it “”balance””
but that it also had certain limitations. Specifically, Kayani said the FC was
incapable of “”holding ground”” or conducting offensive operations. He cautioned
that the US should not expect them to do more than they were capable of as it is
simply “”not in their culture.””

http://www.dawn.com/2011/05/20/admiral-mullen-requests-a-third-%e2%80%9crestricted-operating-zone-for-us-aircraft-over-fata.html

[Kayani asked for “continuous Predator coverage”]

140777 2/11/2008 11:27 08ISLAMABAD609 Embassy Islamabad SECRET
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RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 8913

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RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY” “S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD
000609

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2028

TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PTER, MARR, MOPS, PK

SUBJECT: ADMIRAL FALLON DISCUSSES SECURITY COOPERATION WITH

GENERAL KAYANI

Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d)

1. (C) SUMMARY. Admiral William J. Fallon, USCENTCOM

Commander, met with Pakistan’s General Ashfaq Kayani, Chief

of Army Staff, on 22 January. Kayani provided a snapshot of

Pakistan’s current overall security situation and described

the status of counter-insurgency efforts in Swat. Fallon and

Kayani also discussed areas for expanded military assistance

and training, as well as Pakistan’s way forward in improving

close air support. Finally, Kayani commented on improved

cooperation with Afghanistan. END SUMMARY.

2. (C) Admiral Fallon began by offering condolences on the

December 28 assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir

Bhutto, and asking General Kayani for his assessment of the

current security situation. Kayani agreed Bhutto’s death was

a tragedy and a destabilizing event for Pakistan,

particularly in Sindh province. Commenting on the overall

security situation, Kayani noted that, despite the rising

incidents of suicide attacks, things remained relatively

normal throughout the country. The Army had deployed more

broadly during the recent holy month of Muharram, (a period

often marked by sectarian violence), but had since returned

to their cantonments.

3. (C) Regarding Baitullah Mehsud, (generally considered

responsible for Bhutto’s assassination), Kayani said that he

posed a serious problem for Pakistan. Mehsud had shifted his

focus from cross border attacks to internal assaults against

Pakistan security forces and was conducting training for

militants in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).

ELECTIONS

4. (C) Regarding security for elections, Kayani stressed that

the Army should have no role in the February 18 election – an

exceptionally important election for Pakistan. It was, he

said, the Election Commission’s duty to ensure free and fair

elections. The Army would only be involved if there were a

need to preserve law and order to facilitate elections.

SECURITY IN SWAT

5. (C) Kayani said the militants had been cleared from Swat’s

population centers. They were, however, still present in

Peochar and adjacent tribal areas where pockets of resistance

remained. Kayani dismissed media reports of the resurgence

of extremist group Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi

(TNSM). The Frontier Corps had initially been tasked to

confront the militants in late October 2007, but within a few

weeks it became clear the Army would be needed. The Army

regained control of the area after 2 to 3 weeks.

6. (C) While Kayani felt the Army could not remain a

significant force there forever, he said there would be a

continuing need for troops to control entry routes into the

district. Also, the perception among some that continued

security was dependent on the presence of the Army had led to

plans for a small garrison in the area.

7. (C) The important thing, said Kayani, was that local

people were against the insurgents and it was key to the

Army’s success to cultivate popular support. The Army has

distributed 1 million rupees (approximately 16,700 USD) in

development aid to Swat. (Kayani noted the Army had

previously offered similar assistance in FATA.) Kayani

asserted that it was now critical for civilian government to

take control in Swat.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE

8. (S) In response to Fallon’s questions regarding military

assistance, Kayani first focused on the need for surveillance

assets. Emphasizing the urgent need for tactical SIGINT

capability for Pakistan’s military aircraft, Kayani said he

understood the U.S. was working on this issue and would have

an assessment team in Pakistan shortly. Kayani said he was

not interested in acquiring Predators, but was interested in

tactical level Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs). He noted these

were expensive and asked if the U.S. could grant or loan them

to Pakistan.

ISLAMABAD 00000609 002 OF 003

CHALLENGES IN CLOSE AIR SUPPORT

9. (C) Kayani stated that President Musharraf had instructed

him to examine the various U.S. options available to enhance

Pakistan’s close air support capability, but not to commit to

any of them. After considering the issue, Kayani had

concluded Pakistan could not accept U.S. aircraft in support

of Pakistan Army operations because it ran counter to the

Army’s need to effectively handle combat operations on its

own.

10. (C) Kayani also noted his own policy of selective use of

aircraft in supporting operations as he felt employing combat

aircraft within Pakistan would send the message that the

level of conflict had escalated dramatically. He admitted to

reluctantly employing F-16s in South Waziristan within the

past few days, following direct assaults on Laddha Fort,

including hundreds of rocket attacks. (Note: The use of the

F-16s was presumably largely a show of force as the aircraft

can only be employed during the day, while the attacks were

at night. End Note.)

11. (C) Referring to the situation in Waziristan, Kayani

asked if Fallon could assist in providing continuous Predator

coverage of the conflict area. Fallon regretted that he did

not have the assets to support this request, but offered

Joint Tactical Aircraft Controller (JTAC) support for

Pakistani aircraft. Kayani demurred, saying that having U.S.

JTACs on the ground would not be politically acceptable.

Fallon then offered JTAC training for Pakistani troops.

After a brief discussion on the complexity of building a

night-capable, air-to-ground capability in the Pakistani

Army, Kayani conceded Pakistan could not currently undertake

such a big project.

12. (C) Kayani stated his preferred aerial support weapon

against militants continued to be the Cobra Attack

Helicopter. He observed ruefully that maintenance issues

still plagued the Army; one hour of flight time corresponded

to 24 hours of maintenance. Kayani said that only two

operational Cobras were available in the FATA. Fallon

responded that a U.S. Army helicopter maintenance team was

currently in Pakistan to provide both short and long term

recommendations to improve Pakistan’s rotary sustainment.

OFFER OF ADDITIONAL U.S. TRAINING

13. (C) Fallon offered a more permanent training team at the

Special Service Group’s Tarbela camp to complement the

current Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) program.

Kayani responded that a steady stream of U.S. Special Forces

trainers were already directing courses there throughout the

year. Fallon explained that the small Special Forces team he

was proposing could assist in ongoing training management, as

well as doctrine, command and control issues, and other

higher-level functions. Kayani said the Pakistan military

did not need training and asked Fallon to give priority to

his equipment requests. (COMMENT: It is the assessment of

CENTCOM and Post that the Pakistan military needs and would

benefit from additional Special Operations Forces and focused

counterterrorism training. END COMMENT)

FRONTIER CORPS TRAINING

14. (C) Kayani initially said equipping the Frontier Corps

was a higher priority than training, but LTG Salahuddin

Satti, his Chief of General Staff, and MG Ahmed Shuja Pasha,

Director General Military Operations, weighed in regarding

the importance of training. Kayani then conceded that

leadership training for the Frontier Corps was more critical,

but feared it would take years to show results.

AFGHANISTAN-PAKISTAN MILITARY COOPERATION

15. (C) Kayani said that the most recent Tripartite meeting

with ISAF General McNeill and Afghanistan General Bismullah

Khan on December 31 had gone well. He added that he had

given General Khan a “”blank check”” to send Afghanistan

National Army troops to Pakistan’s military schools. He

praised the plan to establish multiple Border Coordination

Centers as a good concept that would enhance cooperation.

ISLAMABAD 00000609 003 OF 003

16. (U) Admiral Fallon has cleared this cable.

PATTERSON

http://www.dawn.com/2011/05/20/kayani-asked-for-continuous-predator-coverage.html

Army chief wanted more drone support

mullen kayani, WikiLeaks, Julian Assange, WikiLeaks founder, Julian Assange, dawn papers, pakistan papers, dawn wikileaks, dawn cables, Sweden, pakistan wikileaks, pakistan, the hindu, the hindu cables, the hindu, wikileaks pakistan papers, us diplomatic cables

KARACHI: Secret internal American government cables, accessed by Dawn
through WikiLeaks, provide confirmation that the US military’s drone strikes
programme within Pakistan had more than just tacit acceptance of the country’s
top military brass, despite public posturing to the contrary. In fact, as long
ago as January 2008, the country’s military was requesting the US for greater
drone back-up for its own military operations.

Previously exposed diplomatic cables have already shown that Pakistan’s
civilian leaders are strongly supportive – in private – of the drone strikes on
alleged militant targets in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), even
as they condemn them for general consumption. But it is not just the civilian
leadership that has been following a duplicitous policy on the robotic
vehicles.

In a meeting on January 22, 2008 with US CENTCOM Commander Admiral William J.
Fallon, Army Chief General Ashfaq Kayani requested the Americans to provide
“continuous Predator coverage of the conflict area” in South Waziristan where
the army was conducting operations against militants. The request is detailed in
a ‘Secret’ cable sent by then US
Ambassador Anne Patterson on February 11, 2008.
Pakistan’s
military has consistently denied any involvement in the covert programme run
mainly by the CIA.

The American account of Gen Kayani’s request for “Predator coverage” does not
make clear if mere air surveillance were being requested or missile-armed drones
were being sought. Theoretically “Predator coverage” could simply mean air
surveillance and not necessarily offensive support. However the reaction to the
request suggests otherwise. According to the report of the meeting sent back to
Washington by Patterson, Admiral Fallon “regretted that he did not have the
assets to support this request” but offered trained US Marines (known as JTACs)
to coordinate air strikes for Pakistani infantry forces on ground. General
Kayani “demurred” on the offer, pointing out that having US soldiers on ground
“would not be politically acceptable.”

In another meeting with US Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen
over March 3-4, 2008, Kayani was asked for his help “in approving a third
Restricted Operating Zone for US aircraft over the FATA.” The request – detailed
in a cable sent from the US Embassy
Islamabad on March 24
– clearly indicates that two
‘corridors’ for US drones had already been approved earlier.

In secret cable on October 9,
2009
(previously published by WikiLeaks), Ambassador
Patterson reports that US military support to the Pakistan Army’s 11th Corps
operations in South Waziristan would “be at the division-level and would include
a live downlink of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) full motion video.” In fact, in
November 2008, Dawn had reported then commander of US forces in Afghanistan,
General David McKiernan, telling its reporter that US and Pakistan also share
video feeds from Predator drones that carry out attacks. “We have a Predator
feed going down to the one border coordination centre at Torkham Gate thats
looked at by the Pakistan Military, Afghan Military, and the International
Security Assistance Force,” General McKiernan had said.

Sharing of video feeds does not imply operational control by Pakistan’s
military, however, and even this sharing may have subsequently been
suspended.

Despite the occasionally disastrously misdirected attacks which have fed into
the public hue and cry over civilian casualties, there is, in private, seeming
general acceptance by the military of the efficacy of drone strikes. In a cable dated February 19,
2009
, Ambassador Patterson sends talking points to
Washington ahead of a week-long visit to the US by COAS Kayani. Referring to
drone strikes, she writes: “Kayani knows full well that the strikes have been
precise (creating few civilian casualties) and targeted primarily at foreign
fighters in the Waziristans.”

Another previously unpublished cable dated May 26,
2009
details President Zardari’s meeting on May 25 with an
American delegation led by Senator Patrick Leahy. “Referring to a recent drone
strike in the tribal area that killed 60 militants,” wrote Ambassador Patterson
in her report, “Zardari reported that his military aide believed a Pakistani
operation to take out this site would have resulted in the deaths of over 60
Pakistani soldiers.”

The general support for drone strikes from both the military and civilian
leadership is also evidenced by the continuous demand, documented over numerous
cables, from Pakistan Government officials to American interlocutors for drone
technology to be placed in Pakistani hands. The issue conveyed to the Americans
is not so much that of accuracy as that of managing public perceptions.

In the meeting with Senator Leahy, Zardari is directly quoted telling the US
delegation to “give me the drones so my forces can take out the militants.” That
way, he explains, “we cannot be criticized by the media or anyone else for
actions our Army takes to protect our sovereignty.”

General Kayani also “focused on the need for surveillance assets” in the
meeting with Admiral Fallon according to Patterson’s cable. “Kayani said he was
not interested in acquiring Predators, but was interested in tactical Unmanned
Air Vehicles (UAVs).” Predators are considered ‘theatre-level’ technology able
to cover wide regions such as the whole of Afghanistan and Pakistan through
remotely stationed operations rooms while ‘tactical’ drones are less
wide-ranging and can be operated by forces on the ground.

After the first US drone strike outside the tribal areas, in Bannu on
November 19, 2008 which killed four people including an alleged senior Al Qaeda
member, Ambassador Patterson had presciently noted in another previously
unpublished cable (dated November 24,
2008)
the dangers of keeping the Pakistani public
misinformed. “As the gap between private GOP acquiescence and public
condemnation for US action grows,” she wrote back to Washington, “Pakistani
leaders who feel they look increasingly weak to their constituents could begin
considering stronger action against the US, even though the response to date has
focused largely on ritual denunciation.”

http://www.dawn.com/2011/05/20/army-chief-wanted-more-drone-support.html

Shahbaz was willing to have CJ removed after ‘face-saving’
restoration

Shahbaz sharif, nawaz sharif

KARACHI: Even as PML-N chief Nawaz Sharif was rallying
street support by publicly refusing to back down from demands for the
restoration of Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry in February and March 2009, the
party was privately telling American diplomats that the future of the
then-non-functional chief justice was up for negotiation.

“Shahbaz stated that following the
restoration, the PML-N was prepared to end the issue and remove Chaudhry once
and for all,” reported Lahore Consulate Principal Officer Bryan Hunt in a secret
American diplomatic cable describing his meeting with the younger Sharif on
March 14, 2009.

“On the issue of former Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry, Shahbaz
claimed that the PML-N was open to negotiation, provided that Chaudhry was
symbolically restored.”

The conversation took place just a day before Nawaz Sharif would
join a lawyers’ long march in a dramatic public protest for the reinstatement of
judges deposed by Gen Musharraf, a demand that President Zardari had been
resisting. In private, however, a different story was being told.

“Shahbaz stressed that his party could not afford the political
humiliation of abandoning what had become a long-standing principle in favour of
Chaudhry’s restoration,” Mr Hunt reported. “At the same time, Shahbaz claimed to
understand that Chaudhry was a problematic jurist, whose powers would need to be
carefully curtailed.”

Shahbaz Sharif strategised that as a judge who had taken oath
under Gen Musharraf’s first provisional constitutional order, Chaudhry could be
removed – once “some sort of face-saving restoration” had been carried out – “by
adopting legislation proposed in the Charter of Democracy that would ban all
judges who had taken an oath under a PCO from serving.”

A week earlier, in another meeting at the Lahore consulate,
Shahbaz Sharif had
proposed an alternative solution:
creating the Constitutional Court envisioned in the Charter of Democracy and
ensuring that “it be made superior to the Supreme Court. Iftikhar Chaudhry’s
restoration … would then have little measurable impact, as the Constitutional
Court, staffed by appointees from both parties, could nullify his
decisions.”

Even before the restoration, Shahbaz Sharif confided, the PML-N
leadership would agree to any constraints President Zardari might want placed on
Chaudhry, “including curtailment of his powers to create judicial benches,
removal of his suo motu jurisdiction, and/or establishment of a constitutional
court as a check on the Supreme Court.”

“Although Nawaz publicly has said Chaudhry’s restoration is also
a red line,”
commented US Ambassador Anne Patterson
in a separate report, “no leader in Pakistan really wants an activist and
unpredictable Chief Justice. … Nawaz emerges stronger in the public eye and
retains the ‘high moral ground’ by defending the judiciary.”

As late as January 22, in fact, PML-N leader Khawaja Saad
Rafique
had
told
Mr Hunt that a minimum requirement for
saving the coalition with the PPP in Punjab was “full retirement of Chief
Justice Hameed Dogar and appointment of Justice Sardar Raza in his place.”
Chaudhry did not seem to have been a concern.

But by March 2009 he had become the PML-N’s rallying cry, and
the timing clearly had to do with political developments at the time: a February
25 Supreme Court decision had declared the Sharif brothers ineligible for
office, and the president had imposed governor’s rule in Punjab.

“Nawaz and Shahbaz Sharif told Principal
Officer
Lahore that the decision [to declare
them ineligible to hold public office], which they claimed was entirely
Zardari’s, was a declaration of war; they would … take their battle to the
streets. Following the decision, PML-N certainly will participate in the
lawyers’ march,” reported a February 2009 cable previously published in the
media.

“Before the Court ruling, ‘95 per cent of the party’ had opposed
joining the lawyers’ March 16 sit-in because it might lead to violence,”
Opposition Leader Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan
revealed
privately
in a separate conversation at the US
embassy.

“Now, the party had little choice but to support
them.”

http://www.dawn.com/2011/05/20/shahbaz-was-willing-to-have-cj-removed-after-face-saving-restoration.html

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